The Korea Times: Gentle approach on Uzbekistan

The Korea Times May 15 Saturday marked the anniversary of bloody clashes between government forces and demonstrators in Uzbekistan, and in remembrance of those events Western governments and NGOs are calling for the international community to take stern action against the government of President Islam Karimov. That would be a mistake. The West should avoid unleashing a broad and unfocused flurry of sanctions and other punitive measures. Instead, the European Union and the United States should coordinate a measured and constructive message that encourages Karimov to expand steps already begun there while maintaining political stability so Uzbekistan's economy can be revived. Last year, on May 13, in the town of Andijon, security forces and demonstrators clashed in the worst unrest since the country's independence in 1991, killing about 700 according to the assessments of many Western NGOs and 187, according to the Uzbek government's official figures. Hundreds more fled into neighboring Kyrgyzstan. But the political situation in Kyrgyzstan remains tense. An uprising last year ousted Kyrgyz strongman Askar Akaev and the new government continues to struggle to assert control. Events over the past few years have shown that Central Asia is increasingly unstable and the region could easily deteriorate. If unrest again explodes onto the streets in Uzbekistan's cities, the resulting mayhem could spill into neighboring countries. It could make an already fragile country ungovernable. Such a ``failed state'' would be a godsend for Islamic extremists and drug traffickers in the region. Moreover, political chaos would contribute little to effecting the political liberalization and economic development both Western governments and the NGOs they fund say they want. The West should instead nurture the small positive steps initiated in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's central government has undertaken modest reforms, according to some media reports. At the same time, the government has continued its zero-tolerance policy towards NGOs and media organizations, especially those funded from abroad. The roots of this policy date not from Andijan, but from March last year when Akaev was ousted by a popular revolution. Many analysts have dated Tashkent's shift in strategic policy _ away from the U.S. and towards Moscow _ to the weeks after the unrest in Andijan, when the government was riled by western calls for an international investigation. The Kyrgyz rebellion prompted a dramatic reorientation in Tashkent. Specifically, Uzbek officials were suspicious that external forces sponsored the revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Policymakers in Tashkent must have been convinced the U.S. embassy in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishtek was behind the country's opposition movement. They worried Uzbekistan would be next and the Andijan uprising only reinforced their suspicions. They began kicking out U.S.-funded NGOs and other groups with no U.S. connection but working in the field of civil society and democracy. In the minds of the Uzbek leadership, such work is tantamount to preparing people to engage in government opposition. The government seems to be making these tepid reforms on the one hand while they clamp down on opposition groups and the media with the other. One thing it does not do is call anyone in authority to account for their role in last year's shootings. Senior officials understand the real reasons why there was such an outpouring of dissent and they are trying to address those concerns. There have been cautious attempts at liberalization and government reform. The main strategy to date seems to have been to dismiss low or mid-level officials for corruption. The corruption cases are financial in nature, and do not concern the massacre. According to international press reports, Uzbekistan's central government has investigated the interior ministry, which controls the uniformed police and the National Security Service, and uncovered senior officers' control over major banks and companies, and other forms of corruption. Both agencies underwent a major shake-up. Again, the allegations are of financial wrongdoing, not killing people in Andijan. The aim of these purges seems both to show the government is doing something in addition to solving real problems affecting the public. After Andijan, workers at a number of state-run enterprises in the Fergana valley began receiving their salaries on time, and getting unpaid wages due to them from previous months as well. Other moves appear designed to reduce the burden of an often corrupt and always cumbersome bureaucracy. Another important reform concerns taxes. Karimov has instructed numerous agencies that pester private businesses for bribes, such as tax inspectors, firemen, and health and safety officers, to visit the businesses no more than once a year. Also, recent law on micro-credit loans for farmers is also clearly aimed at reducing social tensions. Regional governors, who are key figures in local government, are apparently under strict instructions from Tashkent, the central Asian nation's capital, to handle disputes in a conciliatory manner so people are not driven to mount mass protests. Some Muslim NGOs have demanded E.U. foreign ministers who gathered in Brussels for a meeting that ends today, take stern action against Karimov and Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoev personally through economic sanctions and freezing visas to pressure the Uzbek leaders so an international inquiry into the massacre can be properly undertaken in the country. Yes, punishing perpetrators of political repression is crucial in the long-term. Such a policy would be appropriate, if political instability _ with disastrous regional implications _ were not possible side effects. For now, however, that policy is ill advised. No, what is more important in the short-term is urging the Karimov government in a direction that will bring about reform of the economy and government while maintaining stability, which keeps dammed a potential torrent of Islamic extremism and international crime.