Uzbekistan's new foreign policy strategy

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) November 23 On November 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Uzbek President Islam Karimov agreed to a mutual security pact. The agreement is further fallout from the United States' loss of Uzbekistan as a staging ground for operations in Afghanistan and in the region. After becoming concerned that the United States and the European Union were pushing for a change in government in Tashkent, Karimov severed his ties with the United States and the European Union and moved into the embrace of Russia. The agreement, called the "Treaty on Allied Relations," formalizes Uzbekistan's shifting foreign policy. The Treaty on Allied Relations The Russian-Uzbek security pact creates a military alliance between the two former Soviet republics, stating that "in case of aggression against one of the parties by a third state, it will be viewed as an act of aggression against both countries." The agreement also allows the mutual use by both parties of each other's military bases and installations. The agreement was expected since it followed the United States' loss of influence in Uzbekistan. While U.S.-Uzbek relations had been souring for some time since their high in 2001, the catalyst occurred when Karimov suppressed a rebellion in the city of Andijan on May 13, 2005. The United States joined the European Union in calling for an independent investigation of the incident. Moscow, however, stood with Tashkent. A little more than a month after the rebellion, Tashkent restricted U.S. flights out of Karshi-Khanabad. Then, on July 29, Tashkent chose to evict the United States from the base altogether, giving it a January 2006 eviction ultimatum. The alliance served as Karimov's recognition that a security blanket provided by Russia would serve the purpose of limiting U.S. and E.U. attempts to weaken Karimov's government. Karimov said on the same day of signing the agreement, "I would say [Washington's] main goal is to discredit Uzbekistan's independent policy, disrupt peace and stability in the country, and make Uzbekistan obey." For Russia, the alliance is important since it reasserts Moscow's traditional influence in its "near abroad," and gives it the ability to limit U.S. and E.U. influence in Central Asia. It also provides Russia the opportunity to work on improving relations with other former Soviet republics in the region that have drifted toward the U.S. and E.U. Indeed, the preamble to the treaty states that Russia and Uzbekistan "will fully meet the vital interests of the two countries' peoples and serve the cause of ensuring and strengthening national, regional and international security and stability." Putin, as reported by Interfax, said that the treaty "will allow both countries to strengthen interaction, unite our forces and resources and use their humanitarian potential in order to ensure stability and achieve progress in the region." Karimov echoed Putin's statements, saying, "The strengthening of Russia's positions in Central Asia will guarantee peace and stability and meet the fundamental interests of our peoples." While Russia has security agreements with Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, its agreement with Uzbekistan goes further as it commits Moscow to the military defense of Uzbekistan if it is attacked by a third party. This statement refers more to the ability of the two countries to integrate their efforts against a large scale insurgency or even a civil war than the actual defense against a third country since there are no real threats from another state at present. The two possible states that might have anything to do with such a definition are Iran and China, and neither one of them is willing to antagonize Russia by supporting anti-Uzbek actions. However, the clause also is a veiled signal to the United States. Uzbekistan's Geopolitical Position Uzbekistan occupies a key geopolitical position in Central Asia by virtue of its geography and ethnic makeup. When the borders of the new Soviet republics were drawn in the 1920s and 1930s, large numbers of Uzbeks were deliberately left out of the newly created Uzbek Socialist Republic. This Machiavellian move by the then-Soviet government ensured that a major hot button issue would remain in place for the purpose of distracting the local populations of Central Asia from any existing problems. The question of Uzbek nationals living in neighboring republics would trump any anti-Soviet sentiment since it was a problem that was immediate and close to home. After 1991, Uzbekistan emerged as the most populous Central Asian state, having inherited a massive Soviet-built industrial infrastructure. Uzbekistan also borders all the remaining states of the former Soviet Central Asia -- thus, whichever state would retain influence in Uzbekistan would also be able to influence in one way or another the neighboring republics. In light of this, U.S. involvement in Uzbekistan after 2001 was hailed as a major American inroad into a region that was historically dominated by Russia, and, to a lesser extent, China. Uzbek authorities hoped for greater international cooperation with the United States, especially in the economic sphere. Uzbekistan, just like other Central Asian countries, needs crucial foreign investment and technology to jumpstart its vast economic potential that was held back by decades of Soviet-style mismanagement and corruption. Many factors were in place for Uzbekistan to create a better economic model -- not the least of which is the fact that the country is one of the largest and most important global producers of cotton. Even with the main levers of politics concentrated in the hands of Karimov -- who was in charge of the state in Soviet times -- the country had greater political freedom than its neighbor Turkmenistan, and greater social stability than the civil war-wracked Tajikistan. Uzbekistan's proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran likewise reinforces its potential as an economic hub or transit point for goods and services destined either for Russia, China or other Asian states. Nevertheless, the United States decided to limit its involvement in Uzbekistan to the security cooperation around the U.S.-led "war on terrorism"; it kept its involvement concentrated in the Karshi-Khanabad airbase, used for American operations in Afghanistan. There was no significant economic involvement by the United States that would have tied the fates of the two counties closer together and would have made the extraction of American influence from the country more difficult. The singular American presence in only one major airbase made it easier for Karimov to expel the U.S. from the country -- after all, the same base can now be used by the Russians or the Chinese. The situation in Uzbekistan is much different than the U.S. approach to Kazakhstan, for example, where economic interests centered within the diversification of energy supplies are driving the U.S. need for involvement in that country. While Kazakhstan is moving closer to Russia geopolitically, the U.S. has extensive interests that would make it difficult for Astana to simply expel the Americans. Therefore, Russia has a singular advantage that the U.S. was not willing to offer -- the potential for economic investment and cooperation. Uzbekistan's geographical proximity to Russia and the past Soviet-era economic ties make the relationship between the two states a natural phenomenon. Even with the present small size of the Russian economy, it is still the strongest and most powerful economy in the former Soviet Union. Additionally, Moscow knows that its influence can be re-established by economic, not military, means. Russia recently earned significant revenue from its sale of oil and natural gas, and this trend is expected to grow. It is now infused with cash with which to invest in its neighbors. Most importantly, unlike the United States and other Western countries, Russian investment will not be affected by Uzbek irregularities or the absence of a Western-style tax structure and court system. Russian businesses and investment companies are familiar with the relative lawlessness in the former Soviet sphere, and are ready to enhance the Uzbek economy along with establishing a major Russian presence that will be extremely difficult to extract. Security concerns drove Russia to get entrenched in a major Central Asian player, and once Karimov gave the deadline for the U.S. withdrawal of Karshi-Khanabad, Moscow moved in almost immediately. After Washington's rebuke over his actions in Andijan in May 2005, Karimov calculated that it will be healthier for his regime to maintain power if Russian -- not American -- influence is felt throughout his country. While the threat from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is yet to be calculated, Karimov knew that a response of his choice toward any practical or perceived threat from this organization would have to be calculated against the potential for U.S. fallout. Russia, on the other hand, will not ask too many questions when it comes to suppressing any anti-government sentiments -- whether they be based on religious fundamentalism or a desire for greater democracy and openness. Russia, on the other hand, needs a forward-based approach to any possible infiltration of its southern regions by Islamic fundamentalist forces bent on stoking civil war in Chechnya and other Russian republics. Its military presence in Uzbekistan will allow it to not only "keep an eye" on the states of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and other countries, but actually to respond in force if the need arises. Russia will also be able to become an important power broker in the region's politics by having an ability to mediate local conflicts that often develop along ethnic lines. Thus, it can exploit the large Uzbek diaspora in neighboring states to its advantage, as it will seek to use its influence to prevent regional unrest. For Uzbekistan, the presence of many Soviet-era government, economic and military officials will make it easier to integrate their efforts with their Russian counterparts, many of whom still occupy their positions held since the fall of the Soviet Union. Thus, both Tashkent and Moscow can reach a much faster understanding on many issues than would be possible with Washington or with another Western capital. Conclusion After the multifaceted foreign policy of the 1990s and early 21st century, Uzbekistan is moving toward a stronger partnership with players it perceives as reliable. While the United States remains the pre-eminent geopolitical power at present, it is simply too far away to get involved in Uzbekistan in any serious fashion. Russia, on the other hand, retains its role in the former Soviet space as the preeminent economic and military power. Therefore, in the medium to long-term, Russian-Uzbek relations can be expected to grow, with economic and security goals -- and not political ones -- dominating their bilateral relationship.