Under the sign of Andijan

Global Information Challenge December 2 The Uzbek Islamic Radicals - the Warrant of the Russian Interests Another round of struggle for influence in Central Asia ended in this month. As a result, the alignment of foreign forces in the region changed appreciably. On November 14, 2005, the leaders of Russia and Uzbekistan signed the allied agreement between the two countries. On November 21, the last American soldier left the Uzbek soil - a full-point was put in the history of strategic partnership between Tashkent and Washington. It is already common to think that all this happened as a result of the Andijan tragic events. However, these events were only a pretext. The real reasons are not being publicized. All parties - the Americans, as well as the Russians and the Uzbeks - keep silence about these real reasons… Peacemaking Union Warm relations, that are being demonstrated by the Heads of Russia and Uzbekistan, are actually rather a new phenomenon in the Central-Asian politics. Since the collapse of the Soviet empire, Tashkent was long considered to be Moscow's geopolitical opponent, rather than an ally. However, the Kremlin never abandoned the idea to restore its protectorate over the biggest nation of Central Asia. During the 1990s, not once did the Russian diplomacy and the secret services try to achieve this goal. The pretext to it usually was the regional activity of the radical Islamic movement. The first such attempt was made almost immediately after the USSR collapse. In 1991-92, being afraid that in the course of civil war the Islamic opposition would seize power in bordering Tajikistan, Tashkent decided to go for activating cooperation with Moscow. However, as soon as the situation in the next-door republic more or less stabilized, Russian - Uzbek relations worsened appreciably. Emomali Rakhmonov, a minor functionary in the Communist party, actually a creature of the Kremlin, came to power in Dushanbe. He quickly adapted to a role as one of the levers of Russian pressure on President Karimov. This was especially promoted by mutual territorial claims and traditional political and cultural contradictions between Tajiks and Uzbeks, which become significantly more aggravated in the Soviet period due to the diligence of the Kremlin. In 1994-96, Uzbekistan started to successfully develop ther relations with the USA. In particular this was expressed by the accession of Tashkent into the pro-Western regional organization, GUAM, (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova.). Russia's reaction was extremely irritable. It tried to take advantage of the new wave of activization of radical Islamic movement in the region to return Uzbekistan to the "waterway" of its own policy. Unsuccessful Alliance In September 1996, the Talibs seized Kabul and rushed to the North of Afghanistan. The Russian secret services knew quite well that the true ambitions and practical opportunities of the Talibs were limited by the borders of Afghanistan. However, Moscow launched a huge campaign to create hysteria in the countries of Central Asia. The Russian officials and mass media confidently foretold the rapid coming of the Talibs to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and even to Kazakhstan. The Russians implied that only their armies could protect the former Soviet republics from Islamic expansion. Tashkent was ready for cooperation with Moscow in rendering assistance to the Afghani opponents of the Talibs, in particular to the Uzbek General Dustum. However, at that time President Karimov was still categorically against placing Russian army units in his country. This attempt to force Uzbekistan back into the sphere of influence of the Kremlin failed. Partnership on Paper Probably it is not coincidental that soon after Karimov's refusal to let the Russian troops into the country, the former officer of the Soviet commandos, a veteran of the civil war and the military leader of Uzbek Islamic radicals, Juma Namangani, appeared in Tajikistan. His militants started infiltrations into adjacent Uzbek territory. Remember, at that time the Tajik President still remained obedient to Moscow; a Russian military base was placed on his territory, and representatives of the Russian special services operated freely in the country. The Islamic threat was used again as "bait" for the Uzbek leader. Tashkent did agree on rapprochement with Moscow, hoping that the Russians would influence the Tajiks. In December 1997, Uzbekistan was visited by the head of the Russian government at that time, Victor Tchernomyrdin. In May of the next year, President Karimov paid a reciprocal visit to the Russian capital, where an agreement on cooperation in the struggle against terrorism and religious extremism was signed. However, the entire cooperation was limited to solemn ceremonies and sonorous declarations. Moscow did not use its influence on Dushanbe for the sake of Tashkent's interests. Accordingly, this rather short warming in Russian - Uzbek relations came to an end. Illusion of Love In November 1998, one of the most outstanding and high-ranking officers of the Tajik army made an attempt to raise a mutiny in the north of the republic. This uprising was quickly suppressed, and its instigator disappeared into neighboring Uzbekistan. The Tajik President, in an impulse of fury, swore to take his revenge on Tashkent. A number of his assistants - former activists of the Islamic opposition, convinced their boss to support the Uzbek Islamic radicals, who strove to overthrow Karimov. Three months later, in February 1999, an unsuccessful attempt on the Uzbek leader was made. The Kremlin again tried to take advantage of the situation. In the same month the head of the Council of Federation of Russia visited Tashkent, in July the Minister for Foreign Affairs came there, and in December - the Russian Prime Minister. In July 1999, for the first time in the history of mutual relations, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) transferred to the National Security Service (SNB) of Uzbekistan a citizen of this country accused of terrorist activity. In December 1999, the sides signed an agreement on "deepening overall cooperation in the military and military-industrial spheres." But the Uzbeks soon became convinced that the Russians, as before, were going to play by their own rules only. The first Uzbek Islamic extremist extradited from Russia was detained there, not because he was on Tashkent's black list, but because of his participation in the Chechen war. The agreement on military cooperation was less for the benefit of the Uzbek army, but served the interests of the Russian military industry and the generals. In 2000-2001 Moscow, as before, didn't react to the requests of Tashkent to pressure Dushanbe to stop the activity of the Uzbek Islamic militants in Tajik territory. The terrorist attacks on September 11, and the American counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan finished off this round of the Russian - Uzbek affair. Saudi Intelligence Versus the Pentagon After gaining independence, the Uzbek President zealously reacted to any attempts by Russia's dictatorship. He did not hide his negative attitude towards Iranian theocracy, and was extremely wary of the slightest hints of Chinese expansion into Central Asia. Karimov saw the future of his country as a regional secular power of pro-Western orientation. However, in the first half of the 1990s, Washington very seldom recalled the existence of Uzbekistan. For a long time Tashkent was the initiator in the development of mutual relations. At that time many representatives of the American intelligence community were still in a state of euphoria after the collapse of the Communist bloc. They were predicting in the nearest future the falling of the "last strongholds of totalitarianism" in Iran and China. Under the influence of such forecasts, the White House demanded from Karimov the same as it demanded from the governors of other countries of the former Warsaw bloc: prompt democratization by the Western example. The local political and economic realities, national mentality and traditions were not taken into account at all. The representatives of the State Department for long time perceived Uzbekistan in general as "yet another" backward republic of the Asian suburbs of the former Soviet empire. The Military Stake on Karimov Long before the events of September 11, only the Pentagon saw Uzbekistan as a valuable strategic partner. Many high-ranking army officers, as opposed to politicians, did not trust the durability of democratic reforms and the pro-Western course of Russia. They doubted the thesis that the Iranian regime was doomed, and warily watched the prompt transformation of China into an economic and military superpower of the XXI century. Against this background it was obvious that in the long term the USA would require a trustworthy ally in Central Asia. The analysts of the Pentagon saw the Uzbek President as an ideal candidate for this. Contrary to other regional leaders he was almost unaffected by the Russians, and even more so - by the Chinese. Besides, Karimov represented the biggest Central-Asian nation. In addition to being the leader of his country, he had an appreciable influence on the large Uzbek Diaspora in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Accordingly, in the long term, Uzbekistan was considered by the Pentagon as the best regional bridgehead. The alliance with it allowed: weakening of Iran's positions in Central Asia and Afghanistan; blocking China's expansion in the western direction, in particular through Kyrgyzstan; lowering the chances of Russia's full-scale return to the former Asian colonies; providing the USA with influence in Northern Afghanistan, which also means the upgrading of its role in solving the inner Afghani conflict; creating an additional lever of pressure on India and Pakistan. In a limited format, the cooperation between the American and the Uzbek military was established in 1995. The terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania committed by the "Afghani Arabs" in the summer of 1998, and the absolute uselessness of the reciprocal American strike, increased the value of Tashkent in the opinion of the Pentagon directorship even more. This time, many officers of the CIA agreed with them. Head of the President Karimov's press service told after the September 11 events: "Joint military and intelligence actions are being undertaken for the last two-three years already." In 1999, in conditions of total secrecy, joint maneuvers of the special units of the two countries began taking place in Uzbekistan. The following year, yet another step was made towards the strengthening of military partnership. A month after the Commander in Chief of the US Central Command, General Tommy Franks' September visit to Tashkent, in Washington, the American and the Uzbek Defense Ministers signed the agreement on cooperation in military and military-industrial spheres. The beginning of a "crusade" against international terrorism allowed the Pentagon to convince the White House of the necessity of a strategic partnership with Tashkent. Less than a month after the attack on the USA, the American Minister of Defense took off for the Uzbek capital. On October 5, 2001 as The Washington Post reported, "Uzbekistan became the first state, which signaled its readiness to assist the American operation against Afghanistan during the first days after the terrorist attacks." In March of the next year, President Karimov was invited to Washington. The Declaration on Strategic Partnership and Cooperation was signed there. Tashkent was announced to be "the main strategic partner of Washington in Central Asia." This event became the peak in the history of mutual relations, and an unconditional accomplishment of the American military diplomacy. This fact caused serious concern in Russia, China, Iran, and... the US State Department. The Diplomats' Attack In the first months following September 11 attacks, the role of the Pentagon and the CIA in the US foreign politics sharply increased. This was particularly observed in the Muslim world. It seemed like the State Department was moved to the background. Many diplomats saw it as a threat to their prestige, to their further career, and to a prospective of future employment. Since the spring 2003, they began exploiting military failures in Iraq, and the growth of anti-American moods in the world to restore their shaken positions. Military-strategic union between Washington and Tashkent became one of the main targets for diplomats' critique. The claim that was most frequently voiced was that the Uzbek regime is a dictatorship. Meanwhile, officials in the State Department preferred not to remind that the majority of the US allies in the Muslim world, especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, stand even farther from Western democracy than Uzbekistan. Diplomats also urged that close ties with Tashkent damage the relations with Russia and the Arab countries. For the former they claimed that Washington "penetrates" the zone of the Russian strategic interests; for the latter - that it irritates the conservative milieus of the Arab monarchies of Persian Gulf by supporting a secular regime that harshly persecutes the Islamic opposition. Riyadh's Strategic Plans Certain representatives of the ruling regimes in the Arab monarchies of Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, had been observing with a growing concern the formation of the American-Uzbek union. Many of them treated President Karimov with disgust and even hostility. In the first years that followed the USSR collapse, and particularly after Karimov's pilgrimage to Mecca in 1992, representatives of the Saudi establishment hoped that Uzbekistan would soon regain its position of a stronghold of the Sunni clerics in Central Asia, like it was before the Soviet occupation. The Saudi guards of Islam's main sacred places saw themselves as patrons of the millions of Central-Asian Muslims, who got free from the Communist yoke. Riyadh staked on a religious influence over the population of this region. This influence was exercised by means of organizing the pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, teaching the Central-Asian youth there, building mosques and religious schools in the republics of the region, rendering financial support to Islamic charity, religious, and political organizations. By doing that, the Saudis strived to create a counterweight to cultural and economic influence of the Turks over the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, and to political and cultural influence of the Persians over their kin Tajiks. At the same time, members of the ruling dynasty, including the directors of several big oil companies and the high-ranking officers of General Intelligence Service, were pursuing clearly practical aims. They viewed Central Asia as part of a larger region, stretching from Pakistan in the South, to the Russian Caucasus in the North. Besides the diffusion of their influence over the local Muslims, and the competition with Turkey and Iran, the Saudis were interested in participating in a greater number of regional projects for mining and transporting of energy resources. Not having a possibility to neutralize the competition with Eurasian states on the oil and gas markets, Riyadh staked on getting a share of income from their future profits. It is with this purpose that Delta Oil Company developed its activity in Afghanistan; Gulf Star company and Dallah al-Baraka Group made the same in Kazakhstan; and the Caucasian Investment Bank was established for developing work in the Caucasus (with the help of the commercial structures belonging to the Saudi billionaire Adnan Khashoggi). Pakistani partners were actively helping the Saudis to attain their goals. The Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), using its abilities in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, played a special role in this process. ISI has had close ties with its Saudi equal since the reign of the General Zia ul-Haq (1977-88). The Uzbek Card of the Saudis In the first years of Uzbekistan's independence some representatives of Riyadh hoped that Tashkent would gradually take on the same role for Saudi Arabia in the Central-Asian region, like Pakistan did in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. However, as early as 1992-94, the President Karimov totally dissolved such illusions. He reacted in a tough way over the demands of the Ferghana Valley religious fanatics to declare Uzbekistan an Islamic State. At the same time, the Uzbek leader cut off the Saudi financing of new mosques' construction, and gave an order to expel all foreign Islamic preachers, including those of the Arab origin. Furthermore, in 1994-96, the concerns emerged in Riyadh as to a possible formation of "Anglo-Saxon - Turkic - Zionist" strategic alliance. These concerns were shared by Tehran. Since the second half of the 1990s, this circumstance favored the establishment of interaction between Saudi Arabia and Iran in a series of issues of the Middle-Eastern and the Central-Asian policy. Riyadh and Tehran were certain that this alliance included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Israel, and the USA. In 2002, Turkey was finally excluded from that list. It was the result of a generously paid anti-American campaign in local mass media, linked to a planned operation in Iraq, and of even a more expensive victory of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve KalkA±nma Partisi or AKP) in the parliamentary elections. The "Anglo-Saxon - Turkic - Zionist" alliance not only lost one of its components. As a consequence of the moderate Islamists' coming into power in Ankara, a moral blow hit the young post-Soviet Turkic states. Prior to it, secular and pro-Western Turkey was a model and an orient on their way to the establishment of their own statehood. However, the outcome of 2002 parliamentary elections seemed to indicate that the secular pro-Western model is doomed even in the conditions of a relatively liberal Turkic Islam. It was then time to make a shattering blow over a "dangerous alliance", by means of cutting it off Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. In this propos, special attention was paid to Tashkent. Firstly, it was the Pentagon's main stake in Central Asia. Secondly, in 2002, the President Bush declared Karimov his "main strategic partner in the region". Thirdly, contrary to Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan had full-scaled diplomatic relations and security ties with Israel. Fourthly, Azerbaijan initially was a weak link in forming the "Anglo-Saxon - Turkic - Zionist" alliance. Azerbaijan was Turkey-oriented to a much greater extent than the other Turkic states. Ankara's quitting the alliance had an automatic impact on Baku. Moreover, Azerbaijan was closed from the South and from the North by the two regional powers, strategic enemies of the alliance, Iran and Russia. The situation is different in case of Uzbekistan. Correspondingly, if in 2001 - 2002 there had been no way to force Karimov to cut off ties with the USA, then the Americans should have been forced to cut off ties with the Uzbeks… The Pro-Arab Lobby Versus Islam It is customary to assume that since the USSR collapse, Russia, China, and the USA have been the main participants of the Great Game in Central Asia. 'B' league consists of the European Union (in particular, Britain, Germany, and France), Turkey, and Iran. If viewed more closely, this second category may also include Japan. The latter does not bills its participation in the regional politics. To insure its interests, Tokyo uses such structures that do not usually attract particular attention, like secret services, private companies, and research institutes. The Japanese activity in Central Asia is designed for a long-term perspective. It still does not have any evident impact upon the situation in the region. The same thing cannot be said about another country, whose participation in regional politics is at first sight absolutely invisible. Nonetheless, if the leaders of a certain State do not make highlight declarations about Central Asia, the military servicemen do not loom up between its Capitals, and the embassies do not organize revolutions, it still does not mean that this region is of no interest to that State. It only means that this State uses its own different methods. For a Western observer these methods may sometimes seem uncommon, therefore, usually escaping him. This is the way the Japanese behave, and… the Saudis as well. But, contrary to Tokyo, Riyadh has played quite an important role in the post-Soviet history of Central Asia… Backstage Influence Relevant sources in one of the Middle-Eastern capitals claim that the decisive role in discrediting of the Uzbek regime in the eyes of the American administration was played by the son of the Saudi Minister of Defense and Civil Aviation. A 35-yearold Prince Bandar Bin Sultan headed the embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington in 1983. Two years later he was assigned the status of a minister. Bin Sultan served as the ambassador till summer 2005. For the most part of this period, the offspring of the Monarchial dynasty was not almost at all engaged in the affairs of the embassy. He, however, was considered an irreplaceable participant of the backstage intrigues, clandestine negotiations, and billion-dollar deals, all of them having to do with the US interests in the Middle East. Years of such experience provided the Saudi Ambassador with broad links within the American political and financial establishment, among the high-ranking officials in the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA. This process was favored by the fact that his father had a great influence over the relations between the two countries. Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz al Saud had an exclusive right to approve or to disprove any deal with the American military industry and the aviation constructors (like Boeing, being tied to Riyadh by billion-dollar contracts). Moreover, the Ambassador's father was one of the leading figures in the ruling dynasty - those, who decided on the extent of military cooperation with the United States. Not without the help of his powerful relative Bandar Bin Sultan turned into almost the most influential foreigner in the USA. One indication of his capacities is the fact that in 1990-91 he was the one, who practically pushed the President Bush towards the decision to start military campaign against Iraq. This time Bin Sultan acted in the same way as in many previous cases. Since the end of 2001, during meetings with the officials and private companies' representatives, he began gradually touching the issue of the American-Uzbek relations. The Saudi Ambassador put a particular emphasis on the human rights issue in Uzbekistan, and in particular the issue of "religious Muslims' persecution" in this country. According to one of his interlocutors in that period, the Riyadh's envoy claimed that the close ties with Tashkent do no less harm to Washington's Middle Eastern interests, than its support of Tel-Aviv. Representatives of several big American companies, in particular in the sphere of energy and military industry, usually helped Bandar Bin Sultan in different ways. From the moment of their coming out to the stage, the American-Uzbek alliance was actually doomed. We do not have documentary evidence to that, but according to the informed sources in the Middle East, one of the largest lobbyist groups - U.S.A.-Engage - was particularly active in this connection. It was founded in 1992, uniting 640 giants of the American economy (like Boeing, AT&T, Apple), tenths of leading banks, as well as the associations of industrialists and farmers. The new union aimed at influencing Washington's foreign policy with accordance to the US economic interests. The most prominent and influential members of the U.S.A.-Engage are among the main sponsors of the Republican, and the Democratic parties. They also permanently work in the Congress, and have a great influence over the American mass medias (partly because of the advertising). Moreover, many structures inside the U.S.A-Engage have their own interests in the Middle East. An important part of them have close ties with ruling and financial circles in Saudi Arabia. September 11 events; operation in Afghanistan, and to a greater extent - Iraq, as well as the American support of Israel, favored the increase of an antagonism between the USA and the Arab world. Certain powers in the U.S.A.-Engage lost, but many others won. Escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, military action against the Talibs, and the Iraqi regime guaranteed the large-scale orders to the American military industry. Iraq reconstruction gave giant benefits to the oil and construction companies in the USA. Alliance with Uzbekistan, on the contrary, did not give any benefit to any of the big players of the American economy. On the other hand, they got a chance to find a good pretext for "going towards" the Arabian partners, and for using their influence to terminate the cooperation with Tashkent. So much the more, the same goal was being attained by the officials in the State Department. Triple Strike Almost right after the visit of Islam Karimov to the USA in March 2002, due to the joint efforts of the Saudi establishment, the American diplomats, and various lobbyist groups, the atmosphere in Washington began to vary not for the benefit of Tashkent. At the end of the same year the budgetary committee of the Congress decided that interests of the American taxpayers do not allow continuing rendering such generous financial aid to Uzbekistan. In 2002, this help within the framework of various programs, reached up the sum of $193 million (for an example, in the same year another strategic ally of the USA - the small Israel - received $2.22 billion). Originally, reduction of the help to Uzbekistan was explained only by practical reasons. But the reductions in 2004 had purely political grounds: "for violation of human rights." At that time the Pentagon tried to resist the blunt attacks of the Congress and the White House against its major partner in Central Asia. In February 2004, the American Minister of Defense, during his visit to Uzbekistan, called this republic "the key partner" for the antiterrorist coalition. To compensate the reduction of the civil aid by $18 million in July 2004, the Pentagon allocated additional $21 million to Uzbekistan. However, the military could not essentially change the situation any more. In the course of the next months, the three factors sped up the gap between Washington and Tashkent. Situation in Iraq: The scandals around the American army's actions in Iraq, and the growing losses of the personnel weakened the Pentagon's positions even more. New head of the State Department: Condoleeza Rice came to the State Department in November 2004, after heading the National Security Council. She is a vigorous and ambitious politician, unshakably believing in universality of the American values. The most part of her life she dealt with the issue of the former Soviet republics. Her conception about Central Asia was generated not only due to the academic practice and work on public service, but also by her membership in the Board of Directors of Chevron Corporation. Among the foreign companies Chevron is considered to be one of the most active in the regional power market, due to several large projects in Kazakhstan. By the way, it is included in the list of the main American partners of the Saudi government in the oil sphere. For the State Department top officials, the change of a director meant restoration of the positions that gave way after the September 11 events. Their new chief was sure that she understands the security issues not worse then the military does. And as for Central Asia, she thought she knows the situation even better, and anyway it is not for the generals to decide, who fits the role of the strategic ally of the USA, and who doesn't. Rice is convinced: the generals should follow the instructions of the political leadership, instead of imposing their will. The views of the new Secretary of State have played one of the decisive roles in breaking up of the American-Uzbek allied relations. Andijan riots: In May 2005, in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan, the anti-governmental riots sparked. Tashkent's tough reaction served as a trigger of large-scale campaign against Karimov in the West. The American mass media almost unanimously pounced upon the Uzbek regime. Rice subjected official Tashkent to a sharp criticism. The USA froze the financial aid to Uzbekistan. Later on, the congressmen lobbied the idea of opening a criminal case against Karimov, and of introduction of anti-Uzbek sanctions. In October, the Secretary of State refused in a pointed manner to visit Tashkent during her tour across Central Asia. During the first months after the Andijan riots, the Pentagon tried to soften an acuteness of the crisis, which was gaining strength. In July, Donald Ramsfeld even declared of certain warming in mutual relations, and of the US readiness to consider the renewal of the economic assistance to Uzbekistan. Soon it became clear that the statements of the US Minister of Defense were far from reality. The American diplomats took their revenge over the military. The Pentagon lost its influence over the Central-Asian policy of the White House. Less than three years since the beginning, the strategic union of Washington and Tashkent lost its sense. The USA Conceded to the Asian Threats Some European and American politicians naively believe that the sanctions against Tashkent are capable to lead to the change of the political system in Uzbekistan - to democratization by the Western example. There are those, who still hope that under the foreign pressure Islam Karimov will eventually agree to follow the requirements of Washington and Brussels. The others are sure that there is no need for a dialogue with the Uzbek President, and with the help of the sanctions and other active efforts, it is necessary to achieve his removal from power. The calculations of the first ones were completely crossed out by Karimov himself. His actions from the mid-May up to the end of November 2005 he clearly showed that he wouldl not go for any concessions under the pressure of the West. AIA plans to devote a separate research to the prospects of a change of the Uzbek regime (for this purpose, two of the agency's employees had been staying in Uzbekistan under various covers during the last few months). However, even without detailing on the internal situation in the republic, it is obvious that all the forecasts about Karimov's fast falling as the result of the "people's revolution," which were frequently sounded during and after the Andijan events, were baseless. And now the sanctions of the EU and the USA will damage the Uzbek regime not as much as it will damage… the interests of the West. Mistake of the West At this stage it is already obvious that the initiators of sanctions have reached the opposite result. Their efforts didn't affect the political system of Uzbekistan, but they did provoked almost a full breaking up between the West and the republic (the population of which constitutes almost a half of the population of Central Asia). Most likely, the USA and the EU could have influenced Tashkent much more effectively, and thus to provide their own strategic interests in region, working from within, rather than from outside. If, for the years of cooperation, the West had cared to become Uzbekistan's main and irreplaceable economic partner, today it could have held real levers of influence on the leadership of the republic, without breaking off the relations. Investing in creation of the new enterprises, and the large projects of strategic value (oil-and-gas branch, communications, the cotton industry, etc.) would allow undermining the sociopolitical tension in the Uzbek society, and would provide the West with stable influence on local population in cultural sphere. However, Western countries, and America in particular, were not as much engaged in the development of the Uzbek economy, as in throwing in the humanitarian sops. The following figures tell much: according to the official data of the US State Department, from 1992 till 2002, through various state and private channels, the Americans invested to Uzbekistan $592 million 300 thousand; only during the last, fourth visit of Karimov to Beijing the sides have signed agreements on attraction to Uzbekistan of Chinese investments totaling $1.5 billion dollars of the Chinese investments. It is no wonder that one of the major beneficiaries from the strain of relations between the West and Uzbekistan was China. Thus, the breaking up between Washington and Tashkent stroke the Uzbeks to a lesser extent than the strategic interests of the Americans in Central Asia. In fact, they voluntary gave up their place to their geopolitical contenders in the region - the Chinese and the Russians. Damage to the Western Interests The fatal mistake of the Bush-junior administration is that his team put the abstract ideals of a universal democracy above the American national interests. The main task of foreign policy of the USA became not the maintaining of these interests, but the export of the American democracy (in particular to those countries, where it cannot survive at all, by the virtue of local mentality, cultural and religious features.) While in the days of the Bush-senior rule, the democratic values were secondary, serving only as one of the propaganda tools in maintaining of the US national interests. It is due to this that Washington established partner relations with many regimes in Latin America, in the Middle East, and in Southern Asia, which didn't meet even the minimal requirements of the Western democracy. But, first of all, these were trustworthy allies, and secondly, with their help it was possible to constrain the Communist expansion, and to keep stability (and the lives of thousands, if not millions, of people) in several regions of the world. By the way, the USA still keeps close connections with some of these allies, as for example with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Before the beginning of numerous scandals connected with the American presence in Iraq, a number of the former colleagues and assistants of Bush-senior rendered an appreciable influence on his son's administration. Under their influence, in Bush-junior first cadence (especially in 2001-2002) his team was mainly guided by the real interests of America. Accordingly, the democratization of Uzbekistan was far from being a priority of the White House in Central Asia. With regard of the modern challenges and threats to the security and economic stability of the USA, American policy in the region aimed at attaining two primary goals: Energy: The first task consisted in maintaining of participation of the national companies in the regional projects for production and export of oil and gas, as well as in maintaining of the White House's levers of influence on the projects for transportation of these power resources to Europe, to the Middle East (for a transit) and to Southern Asia. Active participation of the USA in the Central-Asian energy policy aimed at: promoting America's achievement of energy independence, in particular - liquidating the dependence on deliveries of the Arab oil; increasing the American influence on the world oil-and gas markets; preventing transportation of the regional energy resources through the territory of the US geopolitical opponents or contenders, in particular - Iran and Russia; creating an additional levers of influence on the Turkish political and financial establishment (one of the main routes of transportation of the Central-Asian energy resources to Europe passes through Turkey.) Geopolitics: The second priority task of the American policy in Central Asia consisted in neutralization of the "four threats" to the national interests of the USA. The Chinese threat In the long-term prospect, Beijing is one of the main contenders, and potential opponents, of the USA. Expansion of economic and political influence in Central Asia allows China: to increase its role in the Eurasian and South-Asian politics; to increase the ability of maneuvering in the energy sphere; to create mechanisms of influence on export of the Asian energy resources to Europe; to expand commodity markets of the Chinese production by developing of the regional market and transit to the Southern Caucasus and to the Middle East. Accordingly the USA are interested in restraining of economic, political, and, naturally, demographic expansion of China to Central Asia. The Russian threat One of the basic features of the Russian foreign policy concept is a traditional aspiration to expand own influence to the South. Since the end of the 1990s, Moscow activated its efforts to attain that goal. Central Asia historically served as a bridgehead for the Russian expansion to Southern Asia and to the Middle East. Restoring of the Kremlin's positions in Central Asia at the present stage would promote the same goals. Besides, the growth of Moscow's economic influence on the countries of the region would increase the EU's dependence on Russia in the energy sphere (currently most of the gas delivered to the EU countries by the Russian monopolist Gazprom is extracted in Central Asia.) The Iranian threat Tehran is one of the of Washington main geopolitical rivals in Afghanistan, in the Southern Caucasus, in the Middle East, and in Eastern Africa. The atmosphere of animosity is being kept between the USA and Iran since 1979. It amplified in June 2005, after the election of the candidate from the conservative camp to be the new President of Islamic republic. The USA stands for a change of the theocratic regime in Tehran. The achievement of this goal within the framework of the Central-Asian politics can be promoted by: minimization of economical and political connections of the countries of the region with Iran; placing of the American military bases in the region to use in the case of military conflict with Iran; creation in region of an intelligence infrastructure for carrying out operations among the Sunni population of the Eastern Iran (the Turkic and the Beluchi minorities.) The Islamist threat The main source of this threat is the international Jihad Movement, which is directed, first of all, against America and its strategic allies. Central Asia belongs to the zone of Jihad Movement, and other radical Islamic trends' activity. Their activity in this region affects the situation in Afghanistan, as well as the situation in the zone of the India-Pakistan conflict. Under certain circumstances, the Jihad Movement activity in Central Asia may influence similar groupings in the Caucasus, and in the Middle East. In all of these cases there is a threat either to the security of the Americans, or to the American interests. The following factors can help counteract these threats within the framework of the US Central-Asian politics can: cooperation with the local secret services; creation of the US own intelligence network in the region, both for working at the regional level, and in the neighboring countries (for example, in Afghanistan); location of the military bases in the region for the purpose of carrying out of combat operations against the Jihadist groupings. The Consequences of the American-Uzbek breaking up The strategic union of Washington and Tashkent, established in March 2002, had a key importance for achieving all the abovementioned goals. Cancellation of this union will appreciably complicate the observation of the US higher-priority interests. Moreover, Washington had first provoked (in autumn 2001) the activation of the Central-Asian policy of Beijing and Moscow, and then voluntarily gave up its place in the region to them. After the USSR collapse, Russia and China behaved rather passively and ineptly in Central Asia. Their strategy concerning this region began to gradually vary by the end of the 1990s (especially in the case of Moscow.) However, the sudden emergence of the American military bases in Central Asia, near the borders of Russia and China, served as a powerful pulse for a sharp activation of the regional policy of Beijing and Moscow. Today these two actually share the political influence over the countries of Central Asia, over their markets and natural resources. Uzbekistan was for a long time the only state free from the Russian-Chinese influence. Moreover, in 2001 this republic undertook a role of a regional outpost of the West, and as opposed to the neighboring Kyrgyzstan, only the NATO troops were located there. The strategic union of Tashkent and Washington caused irritation and concern of Moscow and Beijing. For them, the Uzbek President was the last obstacle on their way to conquest Central Asia. And now the West has willingly removed this obstacle.