Signs show Uzbek stability buckling under economic stress

EurasiaNet November 16 Uzbekistan’s social order is showing signs of buckling under economic stress. Authorities in Tashkent have consistently insisted that international terrorists are responsible for the spasms of violence that have shaken the country this year. But recent rioting in the Ferghana Valley shows that discontent over the country’s sclerotic economy is prompting ordinary Uzbeks to vent their rage. In what was the most serious expression of popular discontent in recent memory in Uzbekistan, thousands of Uzbeks staged protests in Ferghana and Kashkadarya provinces on November 1-2. The most serious rioting occurred in the Ferghana Valley city of Kokand, where a crowd estimated at about 6,000-strong burned two police cars and beat three tax inspectors and a police officer. Less violent and smaller protests were reported in other cities in the valley, including in Margilan and Ferghana City. The disturbances were sparked by official efforts to crack down on small-time entrepreneurs, mostly traders who operated in open-air bazaars. New legislation requires traders to obtain a government license to sell their goods, while prohibiting them from obtaining goods from intermediary wholesalers. The imposition of these new regulations, heaped on top of an already burdensome tariff policy, is seen by most traders as threatening their ability to operate. Adding to the outrage, tax inspectors, in their attempt to enforce the new rules, reportedly engaged in the widespread and arbitrary confiscation of goods. A more serious confrontation in Kokand may have been averted by Mayor Maruf Usmonov’s pledge to address the rioters’ complaints. However, the region’s new governor, Shermat Nurmatov, has taken subsequent steps suggesting a forceful response could meet future expressions of popular discontent. Nurmatov reportedly removed seven district chiefs, installing in their place, in most instances, officials with experience in the state’s law-enforcement apparatus. The recent rioting undermines repeated assertions by President Islam Karimov’s administration that unrest is solely the product of an international terrorist conspiracy. In particular, the government has maintained that a global Islamic radical network was responsible for four days of street fighting in March, and for a series of suicide bombings in late July. In both cases, officials have not produced concrete evidence to substantiate their allegations. Many political analysts contend that the root causes for Uzbek violence are primarily domestic in nature. Over the past five years, Uzbek authorities have conducted a campaign to eradicate unsanctioned forms of Islamic religious expression in the country. Human rights groups estimate that at least 7,000 believers have been imprisoned in connection with the crackdown, which has intensified in the wake of the March and July incidents. A particular target of the crackdown is Hizb-ut-Tahrir, an underground group that espouses the non-violent overthrow of Karimov’s government. Uzbek courts in recent months have sentenced dozens of alleged Hizb members to lengthy prison terms for attempting "to overthrow Uzbekistan’s constitutional order." The crackdown, however, does not appear to be an effective in containing the movement. Some political observers suggest that the government’s restrictive policies do more to fill the movement’s ranks than they do to deplete them. One Hizb representative, a Tashkent resident who identified himself only as Ulugbek, predicted that a popular backlash to the crackdown could eventually consume the government. "More and more people join us," Ulugbek said. "They are desperate. They want justice. They have little left to lose and they are starting to lose their fear." There is circumstantial evidence suggesting that the country’s economic distress is developing into a source of terrorism. Specifically, mostly anecdotal data shows that Uzbekistan is experiencing a significant rise in its suicide rate – a phenomenon that many experts link directly to the country’s economic decline. At the same time, suicide bombings featured prominently in the March and July violence. This has prompted some political analysts to speculate that Islamic radical groups – regardless of whether they are home-grown or foreign in origin -- may be trying to harness what is largely economically related despair for political ends. One sociologist, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Uzbekistan now has no shortage of candidates to become suicide bombers. During a news conference in September, Karimov himself voiced concern about the phenomenon. Without offering any proof, the Uzbek leader claimed that Islamic radicals were operating "camps [devoted to] training suicide bombers." Officials deny that the suicide rate in Uzbekistan is a cause for concern. Feruza Alimova, a top official at the Ministry of Health, fixed the rate at 7.8 per 100,000, according to figures compiled in 1999. By comparison, recent statistics show the suicide rate in neighboring Kazakhstan approaches 40 per 100,000. Russia’s rate is close to that of Kazakhstan’s. Independent experts believe Uzbek official figures to significantly undercount the number of those taking their own lives. Getting a precise reading on the suicide rate in Uzbekistan is virtually impossible, as the government has deemed such data to be a state secret. However, a EurasiaNet review of police reports for the first seven months of 2004 in Angren, a city of roughly 160,000 near Tashkent, found that there were at least 34 deaths ruled suicides during that timeframe. The data indicates that the local suicide rate far exceeds 30 per 100,000. Even if Islamic radicals are unable to exploit those with suicidal tendencies to carry out future bombing missions, reports on the sharp increase in the suicide rate should serve as a warning to Uzbek authorities that societal unrest is brewing. Karimov’s administration, however, has steadfastly refused to recognize any connection between government policy and expressions of popular discontent.