The Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
Posted November 15

Winston Churchill once observed, "In war it is not always possible to have everything go exactly as one likes. In working with allies, it sometimes happens they develop opinions of their own." Now, in the modern "war on terror," this same visionary paradigm continues to propagate itself throughout every facet of U.S. diplomacy and security policy.

Since September 11th, several Central Asia regimes have demonstrated both cause and support for the operational objectives of American determination. In the meantime, however, the mere existence of this U.S. footprint in Central Asia has continued to dually attract the attention and security concerns of both Russia and, to a lesser degree, China. The former preponderance of Russia's modern "near abroad" remains to this day, just as much a geopolitical factor as a psychological one. In terms of both military power and ethnic majority, Uzbekistan exists both as a strategic hub for U.S. forces, as well as a much-desired ally envisioned by Russia. There nevertheless exists inherent weaknesses within this somewhat, although deceiving, perfect picture. Uzbek President Islam Karimov runs a one-man government routinely bashed for a variety of human rights and local border violations that have remained a continual bane between his regime and the United States.

One exuberating source of the state's perpetual decay remains housed within the economy. The very nature of Uzbekistan's shadow economy acts as an antithesis to any form of state building mechanisms. In turn, the essential middle class and privatization management designed to facilitate democratization processes remains morbidly lifeless. Nonetheless, with the war on terror in full pulse, Karimov presently enjoys a different kind of business that warrants international aid from the United States. The source of this reality is based upon a vast tract of geopolitical concerns that revolve around the regional security presence of U.S. military forces and Karimov's battle with Islamic militants.

On the domestic level, a cycle of violence continues to resonate between blacklisted fundamentalist groups and the state. The anti-state veins that this lethal tennis match directly punctuates include: local and regional efforts at commerce, a flat-lined conception that trumps the writ of state, and the continual demise of regime legitimacy. In short, the escalation of violence not only continues to plague the state of Uzbekistan and its borders, but also may increasingly attract and incubate such threats to regionally-based U.S. forces and the policies they represent.

For Uzbekistan, however, the cost benefit/analysis of its geopolitical concerns and future alignment of national security are presently more critical than the human rights balance sheet. U.S. military forces currently continue to operate from Uzbekistan's Khanabad Air Base, which provides strategic entry corridors that support ongoing security operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

Nonetheless, the regional security threat now facing U.S. forces in Uzbekistan may soon eclipse in seriousness the tension felt between the Karimov regime and its broadly defined nemesis of religious fundamentalism. On the local level, security orientated for U.S. resources and personnel continue to draw future concerns from U.S. planners and engineers; for example, the compensatory measures to meet such needs, as well as to balance the delicate social and domestic apparatus necessary for maintaining and protecting military emplacement in foreign countries. Such a balance depends a great deal toward mission security, which remains a top issue of contention between local residents and the military forces.

Yet, a continued effort by the Bush administration to maintain its nation building efforts within Iraq will require the necessary regional support that bases in Central Asia provide. The concurrency of this relationship is vital regardless of how peripheral it may appear to critics.

The long-term implications to the relationship between the U.S. and Karimov, however, may face a final variable that might, from the inside out, undermine the mission in Uzbekistan: the question of leadership succession. The keystone to cooperation with Uzbekistan is inherently linked to the will and life of Islam Karimov. Naturally, it is in his strategic interests that the U.S. continue not only its military detachments in Uzbekistan, but also continue the subsidization and direct financial support that buttress USAID's humanitarian programs as well as contributions by the U.S. trade and development agency. The United States and Uzbekistan will remain loyal allies with sure signs of deepening investments as the war on terrorism continues. However, with all the links that make this relationship necessary, it remains within the philosophical contraries that emanate from Karimov's rule of law that will have significant consequences to the national interests of the United States. Thus, despite Uzbekistan's "efforts to reform," Karimov's power of rule remains linked to a governing style that entails an autocratic rule and a rubberstamped parliament. With these realities buttressed by a crippled economy and the absence of an undisputed successor, the future seems not only a risky place, but a world where regional U.S. policy and the death of one man may share the same destiny.

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