Radio Liberty
November 12-13

(This are the first and second in a three-part series this week looking at an increase in Russian influence in Central Asia.)

PART ONE

The Uzbek government has worked hard over the past decade to promote the political, economic, and spiritual independence of the nation. But despite such efforts, a different perspective appears to be gaining force: Russophilia is on the rise in Uzbekistan.

Russia, once the self-imposed center of a sometimes restive Soviet universe, has today become a magnet for millions of citizens of independent Uzbekistan. Economically and militarily stronger, Russia appears to offer the prosperity and security that many Uzbeks have failed to find at home.

Malik Abdurazzoqov is an Uzbek political analyst. He said living standards for a vast majority of Uzbeks have been on the decline over the past few years, leaving many people nostalgic for the relative comfort of the Soviet era: "Roughly speaking, people [in Uzbekistan] are becoming more and more Russophilic, despite the fact that a majority of the Russian-speaking population has left the country. The first and main reason for this is that the Uzbek government failed to create and implement a reform program during the past 10 years of independence. Secondly, we are still getting information from, and about, the outside world through the Russian language. That's why Russian TV channels and other mass media are still very important tools in defining public conscience."

A sagging economy and skyrocketing unemployment have pushed more and more Uzbeks to migrate to Russia, where they are better able to find jobs, most often in manual labor or other low-qualification employment. Russia's relatively strong and dynamic market economy has made a favorable impression on many young Uzbeks, including 27-year-old Sevara, who described her attitude toward Russia this way: "I don't know. It seems to me that somehow we Uzbeks are living today thanks to Russia. It is painful to admit, but it seems that half of Bukhara and all of Tashkent are working in Russia these days. My own brothers work in Russia, for example. I have always had a good attitude toward Russia, because we used to go there so often. It's a pity I can't go now [because it is so expensive to travel there]."

Marat Khadjimukhamedov is deputy director of the Ijtimoiy Fikr public opinion center based in Tashkent. He said that Russia's new, positive image among Uzbeks is primarily tied to its economic strength: "Citizens of Uzbekistan look at Russia first as a labor market, second as a consumer market for their products, and third as a market where they can buy goods that are in high demand here in Uzbekistan. These natural economic and social relations have created a positive image of Russia in the eyes of Uzbek citizens."

Another reason behind Russia's improving image in Uzbekistan, Khadjimukhamedov said, is concern over security issues. The Uzbek government has fought to suppress the spread of Islamic groups it describes as extremist and says pose a threat to regional security. But many Uzbeks see Tashkent as incapable of maintaining peace and stability, and worry it would be powerless in case of an armed incursion or other outside threat. As a result, Uzbeks look to Russia as a kind of protective neighbor.

Khadjimukhamedov said a recent Ijtimoiy Fikr opinion poll indicates that, despite the current U.S. military presence in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in Central Asia, the majority of Uzbeks still look at Russia as the most reliable ally in security issues. "We asked a question: In the case that there is a military threat to the Central Asian states, and in particular to Uzbekistan, which country should they rely on and which country they should ask help from? The majority of respondents said Russia. In the social mind-set, Russia is not seen as some faraway country. It is a close neighbor, a powerful and big state. Naturally, the long-time coexistence in the same [Soviet] country can't be overcome overnight."

But analyst Abdurazzoqov argues that nostalgia for the Soviet past is not the only element responsible for Uzbek's growing interest in Russia. He said the decade of independence, rather than invigorating the country, has left many Uzbeks feeling hopeless about their prospects for the future. In Russia they see an opportunity to change their fate for the better. "This [Russophilia] is not only due to the inertia [of the Soviet past]. It's also because people are tired; they see no light at the end of the tunnel, and there is no alternative. People now understand there have been no reforms at all [in Uzbekistan]. That's why they have now begun seeing their future as lying with some large outside force; they are ready to accept America or Russia as a big brother, because they have lost any hope for the future. This is not nostalgia, but a new phenomenon. There is a belief that a big outside force can guarantee some positive changes in the lives of ordinary people."

Khadjimukhamedov says the United States, despite its economic prosperity, cannot act as the "guarantor" of such positive change because of its geographic distance from Central Asia. Russia, as it gains in economic strength, has easily taken on the big-brother role in the eyes of many Uzbeks.

Another key to Russia's growing popularity in Uzbekistan is its president, Vladimir Putin. Rasul, a teacher, said Russia's economic and political image has become clear and strong since Putin replaced former President Boris Yeltsin in the Kremlin: "In my opinion, Russia's image in Uzbekistan improved considerably after Putin came to power, because he took the road of cooperation with civilized world, not the old pattern of antagonism or hostility toward the West. The Uzbek public is happy with that, because now we've got an opportunity to enter the civilized world through Russia."

During the first years of independence, the Uzbek government and state-controlled mass media launched a strong anti-Russia campaign, focusing on the nation's hardships under 140 years of Russian and Soviet control and praising the advantages of sovereignty.

But now -- as government officials and President Islam Karimov move closer to Soviet-style authoritarianism in their political model -- there is less and less interest among Uzbek citizens in remembering the dark side of life under colonial and communist rule. Marat Khadjimukhamedov of the Ijtimoiy Fikr public opinion center said that while Uzbeks have not forgotten about their colonial past, they do not appear to fear that history will repeat itself.

"There is an understanding among the population that Uzbekistan -- and in general, Central Asia -- had been conquered by the Russian Empire, and it is impossible to sweep these years away from history. But these years serve in the social mind-set, in public opinion, as a big lesson -- a lesson that says Uzbekistan must not be under any kind of dependence, colonial or economic. It must remain an independent state. But the image of an enemy, or the image of an enemy state, is not applied to Russia. Public opinion holds no such notion."

But other observers, like Malik Abdurazzoqov, say that if the Uzbek government continues to hold back on economic and social reforms, Uzbeks will turn in ever-greater numbers to Russia, where they see at least some chance for economic survival and self-determination.

PART TWO

Many foreign observers looking at the question of Russia's waxing influence in Central Asia focus on Moscow's lingering political and military interest in the region.

But the long arm of Moscow's geopolitical influence -- often seen as a grim reminder of Central Asia's past as both a Soviet republic and a tsarist colony -- can hardly explain why, more than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's image is once again on the rise in the region.

Central Asian sociologists and analysts say the about-face lies not in politics or economics but in the cultural ties that still bind Moscow to the Central Asian states. In some cases, they say, ties appear to be even stronger now than they were during the Soviet era.

One of the closest ties is language. Marat Khadjimukhamedov, vice director of Ijtimoiy Fikr Public Opinion Center, said that Russian continues to serve as a lingua franca in Uzbekistan and throughout Central Asia. "Without a doubt, Russian is not regarded as a foreign language in Uzbekistan. A majority of the population, even in remote villages, speaks Russian. This means that there is no need to explain to them [what Russia is]. They know it well," Khadjimukhamedov said.

The widespread use of Russian is the legacy of Moscow's intensive Russification drive during the Soviet era. Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan became among the most highly Russified Soviet republics, with urban populations speaking Russian almost exclusively and local tongues relegated to so-called "kitchen" or "village" languages.

When the Central Asian republics announced their independence in 1991, compulsory Russian study was thrown out and local tongues resumed their place as official languages. But the nationalistic move ultimately failed. Within just a few years, many Central Asians resumed Russian lessons voluntarily and used the language for both domestic and outside communication.

The respected Kyrgyz author Solidjon Djigitov offers an explanation for this phenomenon. "To make a developed literary language out of your own language is very difficult. And then, putting all existing knowledge into your own language is almost impossible for small nations. That's why a representative of any small nation, if he wants to be an educated and civilized person, has to know a language that is rich with knowledge and culture," Djigitov said.

Djigitov said Central Asia's decade of independence has done little to alter Russia's status as the preeminent language in the region. He said education funding has dropped precipitously over the past 10 years, leaving Central Asians with little access to information in their native tongues.

Observers say the past decade, which began with pledges from the region's leaders to restore national pride and culture, has in fact brought Central Asia even closer to Russia as it continues to tap into Russia's vast resources. Khadjimukhamedov put it this way: "We are living in a single information field with Russia. Naturally, a majority of the population in Uzbekistan, especially in cities, is still intensively absorbing information from Russian mass media. This single information field, the fact that people here are getting information directly from Russia, creates closeness between our two nations."

Education is a key factor in Russia's renewed influence in Central Asia. During the Soviet era, education in the Central Asian republics underwent a massive revision, with private religious schools and madrasahs replaced by Russian-style institutions and a Russia-oriented curriculum. Better-funded and leading to better career opportunities, the schools in which Russian was the language of instruction gradually emerged as the preferred pedagogical option. It was a trend that regional leaders attempted to reverse over the past decade of independence, but this too failed. Djigitov described this period in Kyrgyzstan: "In the years of euphoria during the last years of perestroika, all Kyrgyz, at least, put their children in Kyrgyz schools. But since education and teaching are at a low level in Kyrgyz schools, and due to the shortage of books and textbooks, now all urban Kyrgyz are sending their kids back to Russian schools. There are few private English schools, but they are for the Kyrgyz new rich."

Gulnora is a devout Muslim living in Uzbekistan. She wears a hijab, the head covering worn by Muslim women, and strictly follows an Islamic lifestyle. But even her strong religious beliefs did not stop her from sending her only son to Russian school in Tashkent. She explained why: "Tomorrow, when he finishes secondary school, he may want to enter a university. Or even if he works somewhere, he will need Russian for communication. Despite the separation of the 15 [Soviet] republics, Russian is still the main communication language between them. That's why I put my son in a Russian school. And then, education even in ordinary Russian schools is much better than in Uzbek schools. Whichever field he chooses, I believe, there will be the need for Russian and English. This is only reason for my decision."

Gulnora said she would have put her son in an English-language school had she been able to afford it. But in a country where the average monthly salary is just some $10-15, few Uzbeks are able to afford the tuition for such private schools, which can run as high as $200 a month.

How long will the Russian language, mass media, and education system maintain their influence in Central Asia? Observers say the answer depends more on Russia than it does on regional governments. As long as Russia continues to enjoy relative economic prosperity and uses it to gain influence in the region, they say, there is every reason to expect relations to grow even warmer in the years to come.

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