As a result of work conducted by officers of the Surkhandarya Region Department of Internal Affairs they discovered 15 kg of narcotic substances hidden by a 33-year-old resident of the Ozbekiston farm, Rustam Bobojonov. Criminal proceedings have been instituted, it said.

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Aibatilla immediately left for Uzbekistan to collect his brother's body. According to the prison medical certificate, Hadiatilla died from tuberculosis. Aibatilla is unconvinced, but found no evidence to challenge the authorities. "I couldn't bare looking at him for long and can't say whether there were any signs of internal bruises or broken bones," he said.

Hadiatilla was arrested on February 12, 1999, on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek frontier. Border guards found in his car a leaflet produced by the religious group Khizbut-Takhrir. "He picked up one of the leaflets in Yrys, " said his brother." But during Friday prayers, the day before his arrest, Hadiatulla, who is a practising mullah, criticised Hizbut-Takhrir's ideas and methods."

About six months after his arrest, Hadiatilla was convicted. He was last seen alive in November last year, when his wife visited him in prison. Hadiatilla is one of five Kyrgyz citizens who've recently died in Uzbek prisons in suspisious circumstances. All the victims had been illegally arrested in Kyrgyzstan by Tashkent law enforcement agents. No reliable information about the cause or circumstances of their deaths has been given to their relatives nor the Kyrgyz authorities.

It has become common practice, especially in border areas, for Uzbek agents to arrest Kyrgyz suspects, mostly ethnic Uzbeks, and transfer them covertly to Uzbekistan to face investigation and trial. Kyrgyz MP Dooronbek Sadyrbaev believes 38 people have been arrested in Suzak and Bazar-Korgon in 1997 alone. Sadyrbaev said that even if the suspects were guilty of crimes, the clandestine actions were completely unjustified. Many of the arrests have been documented by Bakhodir Akhmedov, leader of the Republican Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Muslims.

The case of Imam Yuldashbai Tursunbaev of the mosque in Bazar-Korgon is typical. On August 29, 1999, he was arrested in broad daylight by Tashkent security forces. Tursunbaev, a former religious student at seminary in the Uzbek city of Namangan, believes his problems began after the formation of the Adolat (Justice) party in Uzbekistan and the election of Takhir Yuldashev as its leader.

"During a visit by President Islam Karimov, Yuldashev grabbed the microphone from the president, and began shouting 'Uzbekistan must be an Islamic state. You can not be our leader!'" Tursunbaev recalled.

"The president left the hall immediately. From that day, confrontation between state institutions and religious organisations in Uzbekistan increased sharply. Persecution of believers has grown. Many innocent people were thrown in jail."

Tursunbaev makes no secret of the fact that some of his fellow students went on to become Muslim fighters and were involved in the incursions into the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan. In January 2000, Tursunbaev was tried in a closed-court hearing and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. His brother Ibragim Abdullaev was present during the trial and claims there was no concrete evidence against his brother. Even witnesses did not identify Tursunbaev, Abdullaev said.

Khusidin Sabirov from Jalal-Abad also disappeared in 1999. He too had studied at a seminary in Uzbekistan and had been under the watchful eye of Uzbek security forces since 1996. Sabirov was also tried, convicted and imprisoned by an Uzbek court. Again the reliability of evidence against him has been questioned. His lawyer Azimjan Askarov said Uzbek militia seized him on the border and took him to Mangitog village in the Katta-Kurgan district of Uzbekistan. Police officers claimed to have found Sabirov in possession of a small quantity of drugs and three bullets.

Askarov said his client was severely beaten and forced to confess. In court, Sabirov retracted his confession, claiming it was made under duress. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Even Kyrgyz MPs fear the long reach of the Uzbek security forces nowadays. MP Tursunbai Bakir uulu was involved in the first Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, IMU, incursion into the Batken in 1999. " I'm aware that our neighbour is after me - they're just waiting for the right moment to pounce," he said.

An official from the Kyrgyz national security service, who wished to remain anonymous, said it's up to Tashkent how it treats religious activists, although he did concede that some of its methods were "extremely harsh".

"The population of southern Kyrgyzstan are terrified that they could end up on an Uzbek blacklist of criminals and enemies, " the official said. " We don't know whether those kidnapped are guilty of any crimes, but even if they are blood thirsty murderers our colleagues' actions are nevertheless against the law."

The Uzbek authorities have legitimate security concerns. Extremist religious movements have embarked on an unprecedented level of armed activity in the region. The 1999 armed incursion into the Batken was repeated in 2000. Tashkent uses the activities of groups like IMU to justify its heavy-handed tactics.

But the increasing encroachment of Uzbek agents into Kyrgyzstan presents Bishkek with a serious problem. If this trend continues, said the national security service official, "people will stop trusting us and will think us incapable of defending our citizens".

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В программах начальной школы теперь тексты о задачах правительства по реформированию экономики и достойной встрече 10-летия независимости Узбекистана. Дети требуют от своих родителей объяснить, чем король отличается от президента или узбекская политическая система лучше, скажем, казахстанской.

В первые годы независимости республики власть взяла курс на деполитизацию и деидеологизацию общества, стремясь избавиться от коммунистической идеологии. В результате образовался идейный вакуум. Чтобы заполнить его, правительство приступило к разработке национальной идеологии, базирующейся на идее независимости.

В основу этого курса легли работы президента по государственному и общественному строительству, а также идеи темуридов и других деятелей прошлого. Один за другим на свет стали выходить указы и распоряжения, во все инстанции полетели инструкции и нормативы по изучению этих идей. При этом, как ни странно, основам политических знаний стали уделять внимание уже с малых лет, практически с дошкольного возраста.

Каждый ребенок в Узбекистане должен знать гимн и положения Основного закона. Дети должны иметь представление о том, кто является главой государства, о его месте и роли в обществе, о функциях правительства. Шести-семилетний ребенок, который еще только начинает осваивать азбуку, уже вынужден осваивать огромный объем политической литературы.

"Дети могут получить психологическую травму , - говорит воспитательница одного из детских садов Ташкента Ирина Васильева. - Они не понимают всех этих сложных концепций. Даже взрослым их понять нелегко".

По мнению Сергея Таджиханова, детского психолога, такое насильственное обучение ребенка концепциям, которые ему недоступны в силу возраста, приведет к тому, что эти дети вырастут не патриотами, а просто неполноценными гражданами. Инспекторов образовательных учреждений интересуют не бытовые и педагогические проблемы, а насколько дети усвоили гимн, знают свои права и обязанности. Дети все еще разучивают простые стишки, веселые песни, танцуют или играют на площадках, но этому уделяется все меньше и меньше времени. Воспитательница рассказывает о том, что установку на политическое воспитание подрастающего поколения они получают от районных отделов народного образования.

В школах и вузах предметы по политическому просвещению являются основными, и все они строятся только на одной платформе - работах главы государства. Другим предметам не уделяется столько внимания. Более того, в стране началось повальное уничтожение книг, в которых не отражены идеи государственной независимости Узбекистана и которые были опубликованы до 1993 года.

В списках оказались знаменитые философы, историки, литераторы, жившие как в прежние века, так и в недалеком прошлом. Они внесли свой вклад в развитие мировой науки и искусства, но, "к сожалению", ничего не писали о независимости центрально-азиатской республики, и поэтому были признаны вредными для населения Узбекистана.

Социолог Баходир Мучаев считает, что власти явно намерены "зомбировать" общество.

"Это даже более опасно, чем большевистская идеологизация населения, - считает Мусаев. - Власти пытаются заставить людей искать духовную поддержку в учениях средневековья, используют имена философов тех времен. Но как можно построить современное общество на основе феодальных принципов!?"

Утро в средних учебных заведениях начинается с исполнения гимна и поднятия государственного флага, что превращает этот торжественный миг в вполне заурядное и обыденное явление. Еще большую озабоченность вызывает то, что политизация, идущая полным ходом, затрагивает все сферы жизни человека. Многие считают, что процесс аттестации сотрудников в государственных учреждениях превратился в фарс.

Аттестуемого не столько спрашивают о квалификации, опыте, знании в своей области, сколько просят, что бы он спел гимн, рассказал об элементах флага и герба, и продемонстрировал знание книг главы государства. Те , кто показывают "слабые" знания, являются первыми кандидатами на сокращение. Особенно остро политизация коснулась науки. Кандидат на ученую степень, прежде чем защитить диссертацию, наряду с другими предметами, должен сдать и специальный экзамен на знания работ главы государства. Диссертация, как и любая другая научная работа, будет "завалена", если в ней нет выдержек из работ главы государства.

О плюрализме идей и мнений и речи не идет. Высказывающий свою точку зрения на текущие процессы в государстве, отличную от официальной, обязательно "провалит" защиту или экзамен. Инакомыслие в науке, которая все больше приобретает черты односторонней и консервативной советской идеологии, преследуется очень жестко.

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The average Uzbek citizen earns 9 US dollars a month - roughly a third of the amount required to cover the basic living expenses of one family member.

"I don't have savings - everything I earn is immediately spent on everyday needs, particularly food," said one Tashkent resident.

Since Uzbeks tend to have four or five children, and women find it difficult or even impossible to go out to work, many families would face severe hunger if it wasn't for their allotment. The government has repeatedly failed to back up its optimistic forecasts on living standards with actual figures. And it is also keen that the media refrain from looking too deeply into the issue - banning all talk of poverty indices.

A UN human development report on Uzbekistan for 2000 came up with a GNP figure of 2829, which put the country in the same class as Albania, Armenia and Egypt.

But even this paints too bright a picture. It was calculated according to the official exchange rate which hovers at around three times the actual market rate. Real GNP is probably no more than 1000 USD.

"Many foreign institutions, the World Bank being one of them, tried to study the problem of poverty in Uzbekistan," said independent expert Dalshod Atkhamov "but they did not manage to grasp the full picture."

She points to the fact that local officials tamper with household surveys - and that reports often don't cover the entire country. Some of the poorest Uzbek citizens are the elderly. They used to get pensions of around 16 dollars but the government reduced htis by half on the grounds that pensioners were earning money "on the side".

One Tashkent pensioner, Anatoly Kazakov, took this up with the local social security office but found himself being passed from one department to another. "Wherever I went," he said, "I was told that this was a presidential decree and nobody was going to revoke it."

To add insult to injury, the government also decided that pensioners no longer deserve a 50 per cent discount on their utilities bills. Which left them with just one perk - subsidised transport passes. Consumer goods remain beyond the reach of most elderly people. "My old television set, which I bought in the 70s still works and I don't even dream of a new one," said Ida Borisova.

Levels of impoverishment are worsened by long delays in salaries. Unions say its quite common for worker to wait three to four months to be paid

Imanula Ibadullaev from the Surkhandarya region complained, " We haven't bought any clothes for five years, as we are paid so seldom by the collective farm." Some employers have tried to get around the problem by paying workers in kind, but this method has its own pitfalls.

A collective farmer from the Khorezm region was given a few kilos of edible oil in lieu of her wage packet. She took her produce to the market, where police arrested her for tax avoidance. The officers said she should have bought a trading licence, registered as a private business and paid the relevant taxes.

"This is not a one-off," said an official at the Chilanzar tax police office." These things happen all the time."

People scrape a living picking up bits of work here and there, bartering goods, selling trinkets at the market. For some families, drug-dealing and prostitution are the only means of getting by.

Somehow, the population still manages to survive, which baffles many economists and sociologists. Although the government has set in motion economic reforms aimed at the poorest Uzbeks, the current situation demands swift and immediate attention.

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The new distinction, designed to help preserve popular and traditional culture, complements UNESCO's 29-year-old World Heritage List, a compilation of precious natural and cultural sites, such as the Statue of Liberty.

The 19 ``masterpieces'' designated Friday reflect ``the diversity of human genius,'' UNESCO head Koichiro Matsuura said.

They were chosen based on the threat to their extinction as well as their cultural value, Matsuura said. The designation makes them eligible for international funds.

The Garifuna language, now only taught as a mother tongue in one village in Belize and threatened by urbanization, was designated for preservation. UNESCO also recognized the need to protect the culture and oral heritage of the Zapara people of Ecuador and Peru, whose population is estimated at fewer than 300 people - only five of them fluent in their indigenous language.

Also on the list: the cultural rituals in Uzbekistan, where traditional arts deteriorated under Soviet rule, and the royal ancestral rites and ritual music at the Jongmyo Shrine in South Korea. Member states can submit a single candidate for ``intangible heritage'' designation, to be issued every two years.

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Реальные боевые стрельбы и полеты военной авиации запланированы одновременно в трех зонах. Российские и белорусские подразделения ПВО проведут совместные запуски зенитных ракет С-300 в Калининградской области, отражая “нападение” на анклав крылатых ракет условного противника, параллельно с этим на полигоне Телемба под Читой российско-белорусские зенитчики “отстреляются” из ЗРК С-200 по целям, имитирующим налет вражеской авиации. А боевая авиация союзнических стран и зенитные системы других типов будут использоваться на казахском полигоне Сары-Шаган и российском Ашулуке (Астраханская обл).

Правда, перед тем как приступать к героическому отражению нападения условного противника, военным постсоветских стран необходимо договориться о куда менее приятных - финансовых - проблемах. Москва уже выражала свое недовольство тем, что ее союзники по объединенной системе ПВО стран Содружества не торопятся с возвратом долгов за прошлые годы. Казахстан, Киргизия, Армения и Таджикистан задолжали за использование российских полигонов в 1999--2000 годах, а Узбекистан и Белоруссия до сих пор полностью не рассчитались с российским ВПК за ремонт и модернизацию имеющихся у них систем вооружения.

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The Uzbek government used an annual energy conference to announce the formal launch of a privatisation programme for state energy holding company Uzbekneftegaz. But while the former Soviet republic has large reserves of oil and, especially, gas, it is lagging far behind other newly independent states in the Caspian basin, such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, in attracting investment.

Last year Uzbekistan produced 150,000 barrels per day of crude and 56.4 billion cubic metres of natural gas. Reserves are estimated at over 30 billion barrels of oil and 5.4 trilliion cubic metres of gas.

"Uzbekistan has mutually advantageous terms for investment which will give a new impact for its integration into the world economy," Valery Atayev, a deputy prime minister and head of Uzbekneftegaz, told the conference.

After years of lagging its neighbours in opening its economy, Uzbekistan tried to catch up in April 2000, when President Islam Karimov signed a decree "on measures to attract direct foreign investment in exploration and production of oil and gas."

This gives some important tax concessions and guarantees, but so far few foreign companies have rushed to put money into the country.

Indeed only one, UK-based Trinity Energy, has signed a Production Sharing Agreement, between wholly-owned Trinity subsidiary UzPEC Ltd and Uzbekneftegaz. The agreement was signed on April 27.

"This progressive form of cooperation, the first in Uzbekistan's history, could be a blueprint for the future," Uktam Ismailov, chairman of the state property committee, said.

Larry Bates, head of UzPEC's representation in Uzbekistan, said the company was satisfied Uzbekistan had established a stable investment climate. But Gavin Graham, regional vice-president for Central Asia of Shell International Ventures BV, said that although the climate was improving, difficulties remained.

"Commercial opportunities must exist to do business -- there must be oil and gas supplies and there must be markets," he said. He added that legal, political and fiscal stability were all essential, as was a government comittment to a "win-win situation."

But perhaps Uzbekistan's biggest hurdle to attracting foreign investment is its geographical isolation.

While the whole of the Caspian basin is far from open markets, making pipelines essential, oil and gas from Uzbekistan must cross even more borders than energy from other countries to get to a point of sale.

"There will be hard currency markets for gas from Central Asia in Western Europe and in China, but they will only be available for new contracts from 2008 to 2010," Graham said.

"The Turkish market is oversupplied -- over half the world's gas resources are targetting Turkey. So for the next five years Central Asian gas will have to target regional markets," mainly meaning Russia and Kazakhstan, he said.

While he added that these countries were increasingly beginning to pay on time and in dollars for energy, doubts must remain as to whether oil majors will want to make significant investments in Uzbekistan until market access improves.

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"The results of our analysis of children's rights showed that schoolchildren are involved for six and a half months out of the nine months of the academic year in compulsory labour by Dzhizak Region's authorities. They study only two and a half months. What does this show? We think that Dzhizak Region's authorities are systematically violating the children's rights, and the violation of children's rights or their exploitation has reached its highest level since Soviet times," a human rights organization's regional official, Bakhtiyor Hamroyev, said.

"They are constantly involved in working in the fields and in organizing festivities, and they are becoming a free labour force. Not only are they deprived of education, but accidents also happen," the report said.

Some schoolchildren were seriously injured following a road accident in Dzhizak on 10 May. Five schoolgirls were taken to a Dzhizak hospital after the accident. One of them is reportedly in a coma. The accident happened when a lorry was carrying 35 schoolchildren to field work. A side of the lorry suddenly fell open, and 12 children were thrown out. Five of them were injured.

Over 15,000 schoolchildren and students failed to do any studying for a month during the "Barkamol avlod" (Talented Generation) sports events, held recently in Dzhizak.

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The Kyrgyz appeal serves as yet another reminder of the ways in which such weapons can undermine the chances for international cooperation, even against a common foe.

Kyrgyz parliamentarians and other officials met in the capital Bishkek on Monday to address a situation that may make it impossible for the countries of Central Asia to counter an expected influx of Islamist political groups later this summer. Kyrgyzstan has asked the Uzbek authorities -- but they have refused -- to mark or supply a map of the minefields along the border between the two countries.

Kyrgyz officials said that mines in the area have gone off at least 10 times, killing a number of people, leaving more injured, and doing an estimated $900 million in damage over the last eight months alone. And because of Uzbek intransigence, officials at the Monday meeting asked the international community to intervene on Kyrgyzstan's behalf at the Uzbek capital.

Uzbek officials have justified their placement of the mines in terms of national defense. They note that the anti-government Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has routinely sent its fighters from Tajikistan and Afghanistan via Kyrgyzstan and has succeeded in penetrating Uzbek borders. They point out that Kyrgyzstan's inability to prevent this movement from happening has forced Uzbekistan to lay the mines.

On the one hand, Kyrgyzstan is likely to be able to count on a significant international response to its appeal. Many countries around the world have signed the international convention against land mines and likely will see the Bishkek call as an opportunity to demonstrate again their opposition to this kind of weaponry.

But on the other hand, Uzbekistan is likely to draw support not only from its own population but from two major powers: the Russian Federation and the United States. Moscow has expressed increasing concern in recent months about an Islamist threat to Central Asia and has even used this as the basis for recovering some of its influence in the region.

Russian security officials have visited Tashkent repeatedly over the last two months to underscore their support for Uzbekistan's efforts to defend itself and its region against militant Islamic challenges. And consequently, Moscow is unlikely -- especially in the current environment -- to want to put pressure on Uzbekistan to reduce its defenses against such challenges.

At the same time, the United States also appears unlikely to put pressure on Uzbekistan to remove this minefield. The U.S. has not signed the convention against landmines because it argues that it must continue to use mines along the demilitarized zone dividing the two Koreas. Moreover, Washington has extended significant security assistance to Uzbekistan in a bid to increase its influence there.

Given this constellation of forces, the Kyrgyz appeal this week could set the stage for a far larger political contest than the scant initial reports have suggested. This struggle between the two Central Asian countries over a single minefield could exacerbate public debate in Europe, the United States, and even Russia -- not only over the continuing utility of landmines but also on the nature of the Islamist militant threat in Central Asia and the best way to counter it.

Debates concerning both have already broken out and have become especially charged. The view that the Islamist threat in Central Asia is a homegrown one, produced by the policies of the authoritarian regimes there rather than exported from Afghanistan, is gaining ground in both Russia and the West.

And that perspective makes the existence of the Uzbek minefield less acceptable than might otherwise be the case. But however the discussions work out, the existence of that field already has had one serious consequence: It has, in the words of those attending the Bishkek meeting this week, sowed "mistrust between the peoples of the neighboring republics and undermine[d] the ties of friendship and cooperation between them."

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Uzbekistan has a pre-established reputation for failing to enforce its human rights laws. In March of 2000, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a U.S. Government agency, concluded that Uzbekistan’s human rights advancements were purely theoretical. "There has been no liberalization of society nor any convincing evidence of serious intentions in that direction," read an introductory statement in the CSCE report.

During its annual New York meeting period, from March 19 to April 6, the HRC heard reports from Uzbekistan and four other countries, all part of the 148 signatory countries that are required to submit five year compliance updates to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. The HRC also meets in the summer and fall each year in Geneva.

Uzbekistan reported that it has set up a host of human rights institutions in an effort to comply with the Convention’s international standards, including the Office of the Ombudsman (Commissioner for Human Rights of the Oliy Majlis), the National Center for Human Rights of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and the Institute for Monitoring Current Legislation. According to this report, the NGOs in place to monitor human rights in Uzbekistan include the Center for the Study of Public Opinion, the Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Individual, and various professional associations of judges and lawyers.

"Experience in the development of democracy in Uzbekistan has shown that human rights is (sic) a psychological value of the Uzbek people and an integral part of the national understanding of peace," read a statement in the country’s official report. "Independence has shaped society’s need for the development of human rights, as reflected in the population’s growing social activity."

In its response, the HRC commended Uzbekistan for its effort to bring its legislation "into harmony with its international obligations." However, it also "deplored" Uzbekistan’s refusal to reveal how many people have been executed or condemned to death, and added that it was "gravely concerned about consistent allegations of widespread torture by law enforcement officials."

The HRC’s concerns were echoed by Human Rights Watch (HRW), which conducts its own field research in the country. Cassandra Cavanaugh, an HRW senior researcher for Europe and Central Asia, noted that, at several points, the Uzbekistan report "states ‘this is the law.’ But it doesn’t go further to say whether the law is being enforced."

Evidence presented by the HRW this January supported doubt that Uzbekistan is enforcing its human rights laws. HRW told the Geneva-based HRC that it had documented evidence of the torture inflicted upon hundreds of Muslims in police custody in Uzbekistan.

"Police torture is a standard feature of Uzbekistan’s criminal justice system; those arrested in the crackdown have been tortured by police or security agents to coerce confessions or to incriminate those with whom they have prayed or studied Koran," reported HRW in an official statement. "In the past two years alone, at least fifteen people have died in custody due to torture."

Among its recommendations, the HRC cited the need for Uzbekistan to guarantee an independent judiciary and to ensure that women get protection from domestic violence. The HRC also specifically referred to more than 1,300 Tajiks, citizens of Uzbekistan, who were resettled from their villages in the mountains to the steppes of the Sherabad region, and called for an end to the expulsion of people from their homes.

Editor’s Note: Todd Diamond is a journalist who covers the United Nations

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The UN’s Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN ODCCP) boasts that opium poppy cultivation has dramatically declined in Afghanistan, while drug seizures have dramatically risen. The ODCCP claims that its crop substitution programs in Afghanistan have virtually stopped opium cultivation there: although poppy cultivation continued to grow during the 1990s, reaching a peak in 1999, the UN reports a dramatic reduction, if not total eradication of the poppy crop in 2000.

But others are skeptical. Critics of these findings -- including the U.S. government -- say production levels cannot be judged with any degree of certainty until satellite imagery reveals a fuller picture, and that declines in production likely are due to reasons that have little to do with western programs or political commitment on the part of Afghanistan. Any production declines, they say, would be due to the effects of the serious draught that hit this area last year, and even to a calculated business decision on the part of the Taliban to use up existing stockpiles and attempt to artificially drive up the price of heroin -- while gaining political brownie points in the process. The US DEA has already noted a steep rise over the past few months in the price of heroin in this region.

Likewise with interdiction. Again, UN ODCCP and other donors report, in the words of one UN official, "some startling good statistics associated with drug interdiction rates in Central Asia." These reports reference rates in Kyrgyzstan, reportedly up fivefold between 1995-2000, and Tajiks are reporting up to 1.3 tons of heroin interdicted in Tajikistan in the first nine months of 2000. The U.S. government reports high numbers of Central Asians trained in counter-narcotics techniques, and growing quantities of equipment shipped for border guards, customs officials and others. But critics argue that seizure rates -- particularly as they continue to focus on the "small fish" -- may have increased not as a result of more effective law enforcement, but as a byproduct of higher trafficking rates.

And likewise with other programs. While some praise the establishment of new drug commissions and other anti-narcotics agencies, others criticize them as exacerbating the widespread corruption inherent in these countries, particularly in governments and law enforcement. While some endorse the ODCCP-supported bio-chemical research program in Uzbekistan, others are concerned about the long-term effects on plant and animal life and potential links to biological terrorism. And still others have questioned whether the training and equipment provided by the U.S. and others to Central Asia has actually been used to fight drug trafficking, or to crack down on domestic political opposition. One U.S. State Department official called the transfer of night vision goggles to Central Asia "abhorrent."

Complicating the controversies has been a number of factors inherent in the Central Asian drug trade. One is the contradictory and inconsistent baseline data, leading, for example, to a divergence in U.S. and UN estimates of opium cultivation. In 1999, for example, U.S. government estimates of 2700 metric tons of opium produced in Afghanistan contrasted markedly with the 4600 metric tons estimated by the UN. The ODCCP estimates suggest a further 28 percent decline of opium production in 2000 versus the roughly 30 percent increase in production reported in U.S. estimates.

Another is the widespread, and deep-seated corruption characteristic of these countries, and particularly in their law enforcement agencies, that allows narcotics trafficking to flourish. All of the Central Asian leaders have criticized their own law enforcement officials for being deeply involved in the drug trade in one way or another. Some western specialists involved in programs have expressed concern that they do not always know whether they are transferring expertise to create more highly professional law enforcement -- or more sophisticated traffickers. Limited resources and regional expertise often limits the ability of programs to assess who wins, and who loses from the rampant trafficking in Central Asia -- and from western programs introduced to combat it.

This is further compounded by limited resources and demand for follow up, evaluation and monitoring. Funding for programs overall is limited and fickle, with the UN in particular dependent on voluntary contributions that can change dramatically from one day to the next. Standard mechanisms for reporting and evaluation, as well as formal evaluations of western counter- narcotics programs in Central Asia, are generally cursory, if conducted at all, and often not available for outside consumption.

In addition, programs are handicapped by limited regional expertise, and by limited transparency or accessibility that hampers input from local communities themselves. Many counter-narcotics training programs are designed and implemented by law enforcement specialists with little, if any, prior experience in this part of the world. Training programs are often designed and organized, and trainees often selected, by local foreign service nationals with little independent vetting, while instructors are provided little support to ensure that their training fits the Central Asian context.

It is difficult to for independent observers to assess the controversies and the extent of these challenges because little information is publicly available. But some observers suggest that if these issues are not addressed openly, western programs could well have serious unintended societal impacts that go well beyond questions of interdiction alone.

Editor’s Note: Nancy Lubin is President of JNA Associates, Inc. -- a research and consulting firm that works on assessments and projects concerning the NIS, especially Central Asia. She has lived, worked and traveled throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus for well over twenty five years -- as a Congressional staffer, University Professor, and now for JNA -- and consults for international donors, the media, major corporations and smaller, start up companies.

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