Turkey-Uzbekistan Joint Economic Commission (JEC) protocol was signed in Ankara on Friday. Abdulhaluk Cay, state minister, signed the protocol on behalf of Turkey, and Elyar Ganiyev, Uzbek foreign economic relations minister, signed the protocol on behalf of his country.

Addressing the signing ceremony, Cay said high level visits, and positive relations between the two countries reiterated that there was a political determination to improve bilateral relations.

Cay said importance should be attributed to trade and economic relations between the two countries, adding that trade and economic relations between the two countries failed to reflect the real potential.

Cay said, "While determining the measures we will take to improve trade and economy relations, we should think of two sine qua non fields; that is, the banking sector and the transportation."

"If we fail to establish a cooperation in international standards in banking and transportation facilities, unfortunately, the measures we will take in other sectors would not serve to the target we desire," he said, adding that Turkey attributed a special importance to improve relations with the friendly countries in Central Asia and Caucasia which newly gained their independence.

The guest Uzbek minister invited Turkish businessmen to invest in Turkey and noted that there may be cooperation in process of food products, agriculture, textile, and automotive sub-industry.

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По словам Лепешкина, проводившиеся на острове испытания биологического оружия, несмотря на все предпринимавшиеся меры предосторожности, оставили изменения в животном мире, и носителями опасных заболеваний на острове Возрождения могут являться мыши и тушканчики.

Геннадий Лепешкин отметил, что все испытания, проводившиеся на острове Возрождения, сопровождались противоэпидемическими мероприятиями, полигон обрабатывался дезрастворами. Кроме того, температура воздуха на острове летом достигает 45-50 градусов по Цельсию, что позволяло через 10 дней после проведения очередного испытания "естественным путем" "свести практически к нулю" уровень бактериологического загрязнения почвы, добавил он.

Однако пыльные бури и ветра могли закрывать некоторые участки суши острова от солнца, и на них могли остаться живые микроорганизмы, в частности, это касается "сибироязвенных агентов", сказал Геннадий Лепешкин.

Между тем в настоящее время с каждым годом опасность распространения инфекции может усугубляться, так как Аральское море мелеет, и, соответственно, остров увеличивается в размерах. По данным Лепешкина, если в 1950-х годах площадь острова составляла 200 квадратных километров, то сейчас - 2 тысячи квадратных километров.

Более того, отметил Лепешкин, остров Возрождения со стороны соседнего Узбекистана в прошлом году уже соединился с материком, и его уже можно назвать полуостровом. Нетрудно предположить, отметил ученый, что имеющаяся между островом и материком перемычка позволит легко мигрировать "на большую землю" зараженным животным.

Ссылаясь на данные зарубежной прессы, Лепешкин сообщил, что американские специалисты при проведении исследования острова в 1995 году выявили там захоронения контейнеров с сибирской язвой. По данным Лепешкина, три года назад Центр биотехнологий Казахстана совместно с Казахстанским противочумным научно-исследовательским институтом направили в Международный научно-технический центр, а также в ряд американских институтов проект по исследованию острова.

Однако, отметил Лепешкин, международные организации не могут приступить к реализации научных исследований на острове из-за того, что Казахстан и Узбекистан не могут договориться о правовом статусе острова Возрождения. В настоящее время считается, что 2/3 территории острова принадлежат Узбекистану, 1/3 - Казахстану.

Небольшая испытательная биологическая площадка на острове Возрождения в Аральском море действовала в 1936-37 годах. Впоследствии биополигон возобновил свою работу в 1954 году. Тогда здесь методом распыления и подрыва испытывали чуму, бруцеллез, сибирскую язву и большое количество модельных реагентов.

Полигон функционировал до 1992 года, затем воинский контингент был передислоцирован, биолаборатория - демонтирована, часть оборудования военные вывезли за пределы острова, а часть осталась захороненной на острове.

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There are some interesting peculiarities in the relationships between Uzbek officials and Jews, and to understand them a look back at history is needed. Two ethnically distinct groups of Jews are found in Uzbekistan – Bukharan and Ashkenazi (European) Jews. Bukharan Jews have lived in Central Asia for more than 2000 years, and came here through ancient Iran and speak the Tajik (Persian) language. In the Bukharan Emirate and the Kokand Khanate, Jews were on the very bottom of society, and were the victims of constant discrimination. Pogroms and forced conversions into Islam were customary. Subsequently, as a result of Russian colonization (in the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries), in which Bukharan Jews assisted the Russian army, they were given equal rights and a special status: ‘tuzemnie evrei’ (indigenous Jews). They were even relieved off discriminatory laws that other Jews of Russia were subjected to. Ashkenazi (European) Jews from Russia, Ukraine and Poland began to relocate here in the beginning of the twentieth century. A lot of them came to Central Asia as refugees during the First World War. Many Jewish doctors, engineers, teachers etc. appeared here after the establishment of Soviet rule and the foundation of the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan in 1924. They played a significant role in the formation of a local elite in the 1930-40s.

Over a million Jews, refugees from the European part of the USSR and Eastern Europe migrated through Uzbekistan during the Second World War. Those people found a shelter from the Holocaust and about 200 thousands of them stayed on after the War. Many of them were intellectuals and, as a result, the percentage of Jews working in the sphere of education, medicine, science, technology and culture in Uzbekistan was higher than elsewhere in the USSR. Those people have taught and raised the Uzbek establishment that took up leading positions in the 1960-80s, and this is one explanation for the relatively low level of state anti-Semitism in Uzbekistan at that time. Unlike in Russia and Ukraine, there were no litigations against ‘dissident’ Jews; moreover, almost no ‘anti-Zionist’ (anti-Semitic) books and articles were published. Under such conditions, Jews sometimes managed to occupy significant posts, including as executive industrial managers, major government officers, even vice-ministers. On the other hand anti-Semitism persisted in all levels of Uzbek society.

Jews were often divided into ‘good’ Jews and others – cruel, selfish, guileful ‘kikes’, building their secret conspiracies. During the disintegration of the USSR and with the foundation of the independent Republic of Uzbekistan in 1991, the situation began to deteriorate. The abrupt growth of nationalism, chauvinism and xenophobia among the Uzbek public consciousness, and the rapid Islamic revival contributed to a sudden increase in the level of emigration of national minorities and, in particular, Jews (both Bukharan and Ashkenazi). During the following 5-6 years Jews were leaving the country at annual rates of tens of thousands. Uzbek officials failed to impede this process. However, they didn’t hesitate to play a ‘Jewish trump’. Desperately in need for international recognition, the government of Uzbekistan very soon established diplomatic relationships with Israel, set up contact with international Jewish organizations, and sponsored visits of major Jewish leaders. Contacts with Jewish organizations in the USA were made via the embassy of Uzbekistan in Washington, DC, including by the ambassador personally. Uzbek ambassador Mr. Sadyk Safaev likes to demonstrate his kippah (Jewish cap) – a present from his Jewish friends. Rabbi David Gurevitch, a representative of the ‘Habad-Lubavitch’ movement, was admitted in Uzbekistan, and immediately proclaimed himself a Chief Rabbi of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

Unfortunately, this generated very little impact on the condition of Jewish life in Uzbekistan. In the early 1990s there were pogroms in Andijan where Jewish homes were burned and ruined, and several acts of vandalism on Jewish cemeteries in Tashkent and other cities took place. There are instances of persecution of Jews by Uzbek security services. When such facts become known, Uzbek officials claim not to know about it and promise to punish culprits. Whether it happens or not is unknown, however it is known that the practice of organized violence goes on. Coming back to the question whether there is a future for Jews of Uzbekistan, it is difficult to be optimistic. Undoubtedly, some Jews will probably stay in this country for some reason or other, as is the case even in Iraq and Iran. However, it’s perfectly clear that a new revival of economical and cultural life of Jews in Uzbekistan is unlikely to happen. The active presence of Jews in society is a chapter of the past.

(By Dr. Mikhail Degtiar, Professor of sociology and former chairman of Tashkent Jewish Cultural Center)

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But despite its problems, Tashkent curiously refuses to negotiate with its neighbours, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, over sharing water resources. One of the worst hit areas of Uzbekistan is Karakalpakstan in the northwest. As a consequence of severe dought, the region received only 42 per cent of its average annual supply of water last year.

This has devastated agriculture, the main sector of the local economy. Many rice and cotton plantations are said to have perished. Pastures are so withered that cattle have had to be slaughtered. Last year drought devastated around 300,000 hectares of crops in the region, directly affecting the livelihood of about 50,000 families. People were forced to drink poor quality water, which resulted in a rise in diseases such as hepatitis and tuberculosis.

Vadim Antonov of the ministry of agriculture and water resources lays the blame on population growth which has increased four-fold to 25 million over the last hundred years, according to official statistics.

The population is currently growing by about 500,000 a year, requiring enormous amounts of land to be turned over to agriculture, exhausting water supplies and draining the Aral Sea. Within 10 years, says Antonov, Uzbekistan won't have the water resources to meet its needs

Some experts have suggested exploiting large reserves of fresh underground water in the northeast of the southern Aral Sea area. They propose building a plant to bottle the supply to provide the population with drinking water. But in the long term, it seems, the only solution will be to use supplies from outside the country. One suggestion is to revive a plan to divert Siberian rivers to Central Asia. The project was dropped several years ago after critical press reports.

"Russia is prepared to revive the plan," said Antonov. "Because if we use their water, we can in turn supply people in Siberia and the Urals with fruit and vegetables, which are in short supply. Some people have never seen grapes, let alone watermelons."

The project would involve the construction of a canal costing around US$16 billion, but none of the countries in the region have this sort of money. The cost could explain why high-ranking Uzbek officials prefer to ignore the water problem altogether. International organizations - the World Bank in particular - are reluctant to back such schemes too. A grant for preliminary analysis was refused.

They say that Uzbekistan's problem has less to do with shortages than mismanagement of existing water resources, and that distribution systems must be reformed first. According to Antonov, 40 per cent of irrigation water could be re-used. The problem with this is that it would contain dissolved ground salts, mineral fertilizers and poisonous chemicals.

To install a modern irrigation system - such as Israel's - would cost around $10 million, which Tashkent could not afford in the current economic climate. Antonov believes the Tokhogul reservoir in Kyrgyzstan is Uzbekistan's best hope. He says all the countries in the region could strike an agreement to share the valuable resource.

The reservoir was built 26 years ago explicitly to support irrigation. In Soviet times, the water was shared between the republics. But several years ago, Kyrgyzstan began using the water for energy, depriving Uzbekistan. An agricultural catastrophe there was only avoided because land had been relatively well irrigated over the preceding decade. Kyrgyzstan's need for electricity is understandable. But its monopolisation of this scarce resource angers Uzbeks."Water is like air," said Antonov. "It cannot have an owner."

But Tashkent isn't entirely blameless. It could have offered Kyrgyzstan electricity and natural gas in exchange for water. But the country's leaders are unwilling to do so: all Antonov's proposals on the matter have been ignored. Instead, the government is blaming farmers for not using water economically.

In an article in the newspaper Pravda Vostoka, Bioecology specialist Amin Bakhiyev, citing regional figures in Karalpakstan, said 40 per cent of water is lost in the irrigation system. The authorities have warned they will not help farmers harvest their crops if they continue to fritter away the country's water resources. But such punitive measures are unfair. This has less to do with bad farming practices than severe climatic demographic problems. Until politicians acknowledge the seriousness of the water shortages, the problem is only likely to get worse.

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GUUAM’s organizational delays have been largely attributed to a "crowded working schedule" of Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliyev, who is struggling to find a political arrangement with Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh’s status. Another factor reportedly has been the parliamentary elections in Moldova. However, a deeper reason for GUUAM’s developmental difficulties is likely connected to persistent Russian opposition to the project.

In 1997, the leaders of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (Uzbekistan joined the group later, in April 1999) met in Strasbourg, under the auspices of the Council of Europe, and decided to form a new organization with the stated aims of counterbalancing Russia's political dominance in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and lessening members' energy dependence on Russia by securing alternative sources of oil and gas deliveries.

As stated in an analytic memo penned by Sergei Pirozhkov and Boris Parakhonsky – two strategists of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council – two desires governed the emergence of GUUAM: "The striving of the newly independent states to get rid of the ‘elder brother's’ over-lordship" and "the striving of these nations to use their advantageous geographic location, especially with regard to the forming of new energy transit routes leading from Europe to the East… to actively participate in the large-scale integration processes along the Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia line."

The matter is that these goals, no less important now than they were at the time of GUUAM’s founding, are extremely difficult to attain under current circumstances, which throws the very existence of GUUAM into question. To understand why it is so one has to look at the policies of the three major players in the Black Sea-Caspian region: Russia, Turkey and the United States.

It goes without saying that Russia is the country least interested in the flourishing of GUUAM. From the very outset Moscow politicians viewed this grouping as inimical to Russian national interests. GUUAM additionally represents a potential challenge to Moscow’s own efforts at organizing an economic bloc of states, the Eurasian Economic Union.

Russian officials also perceive GUUAM as a potential political danger. Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov once bluntly called GUUAM a "political organization tending to grow into a military-political one." In a recent article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper Vladimir Aksyonov, first deputy chairman of the Central Council of the Union Public Chamber (a quasi-parliament of the pseudo-union state of Russia and Belarus) labeled GUUAM a "main anti-Russian geopolitical construct."

At the same time it should be noted that Moscow, by changing its tactics in dealing with "near abroad" states, has managed to neutralize GUUAM as a potential counterweight within the CIS. Russia’s new foreign policy doctrine -- unveiled in July 2000 – called for a shift in emphasis, stressing bilateral relations with CIS countries, in contrast to the numerous but mostly fruitless multilateral summits that were popular during Yeltsin era. "Practical relations with each [member of the CIS] should be built mindful of the reciprocal openness and readiness to duly take into account the interests of the Russian Federation," assert the authors of the strategic policy blueprint.

This trend was confirmed by the recent pronouncements of Sergei Ivanov, the newly appointed head of Russia’s defense ministry. He told a security conference in Munich that Russia had conducted "a review of the main directions" of its CIS policies "brought about by the realization that accelerated development of the Commonwealth into a fully fledged international association is not possible in the near future". Instead, Russia would pursue its interests "first of all through the development of bilateral relations with CIS countries." In dealing with Moscow one on one, however, GUUAM seems to be not of much use. In the new format of relationship, Moscow does not want its negotiating partners to coordinate their positions and come out against Russia as a "united front."

Turkey is not a big friend of GUUAM either. Their interests clash over the issue of the transport routes of Caspian oil. Ankara is obviously interested in the realization of the Baku-Ceyhan project. Ukraine, for its part, is lobbying the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Ukraine-Poland route. Thus, writes the influential Kiev weekly Zerkalo Nedeli, "to a certain extent Ankara is the competitor of Kiev as far as the strengthening of GUUAM and transporting of energy carriers are concerned."

It would seem that the United States is whole-heartedly supportive of GUUAM. It is no secret that the American main strategic objective in Eurasia is the preservation of "geopolitical pluralism in the post-Soviet space." On the other hand, by throwing its entire weight behind the Baku-Ceyhan route, Washington is effectively undermining GUUAM's economic and political raison d’etre, at least from Ukraine's point of view. "The US appears to realize the advantages of the existence of several transport routes for Caspian oil. Yet in reality it fully backs the Baku-Ceyhan project. Such an exclusive support is Washington's mistake," points out the RAND analyst Olga Olicker in the paper titled "Ukraine and the Caspian Region."

Being unable to collectively oppose Moscow's pressure, and facing serious obstacles in obtaining alternative sources of energy, the GUUAM countries seem to be slowly losing interest in this potentially promising geopolitical project.

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Since 1991, hardly a year has passed in Central Asia without a major cultural anniversary being marked in one or more states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Indeed, it has sometimes appeared as though the newly independent Central Asian countries have engaged in a competition to demonstrate the most vibrant heritage. Kazakhstan has marked the anniversaries of the poet Abay and the foundation of the town of Turkestan. Uzbekistan has held celebrations in honor of the medieval Mongol warlord Timur, as well as honoring the great Persian thinkers Bukhari and Ferghani. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan has marked the millennium of the epic "Manas," and the 3,000th anniversary of the foundation of Osh. Tajikistan, not to be outdone, has commemorated the millennium of the Samanid dynasty.

These events have been largely staged with an aim towards promoting a cultural revival, and shaping national identity. In a relatively short time, Central Asian states have managed to distance themselves from the Soviet legacy. School curricula, dominated a decade ago by the Russian view of history, have been overhauled. At the same time, local historians with and without governmental support are intensely studying Central Asia’s past, searching for national roots. A new generation of students is learning history through new books, and governmental mass media eagerly devote their coverage to the revival of history that had remained obscure during the Soviet era.

However, historians of each of the Central Asian republics greatly differ in their interpretation of the past. New ideologists have created a new approach, looking at everything through a national mirror. Some even feel inclined to assign a particular ethnic identity to historical figures who had been previously considered common ancestors. For example, attempts have been made to portray the medieval Turkic thinker Farabi (circa 9th-10th century) as a Kazakh because was born on the territory of modern Kazakhstan.

Likewise, some Kyrgyz historians claim that the Turkic scholar Makhmud Kashgari-Barskani (12th century), and the author of the first poem in Turkic language Jusup Balasaguni (11th century), are Kyrgyz because they lived during the Karakhan dynasty, which controlled the territory of the modern Kyrgyz Republic. Furthermore, a few Kyrgyz experts claim that some elements of the ruling Karakhan tribes are thought to have been incorporated into the Kyrgyz ethnic fabric. Those assertions are disputed by Uighur academics, who claim Balasaguni and Kashgari as their own. To strengthen their own claim to Balasaguni and Kashgari, Kyrgyz authorities erected statues of both men in the capital Bishkek.

Uzbekistan has perhaps been most aggressive in claiming direct connections to the past. In the Uzbek view, the medieval warlord Timur, also known as Tamerlane, is no longer a Mongol-Turkic figure but a father of the Uzbek nationality. "Tamerlane spent his lifetime fighting against Uzbeks, whom he considered arch enemies. If only he knew that he was going to be given a new ethnic origin he would not have wasted his time," Kyrgyz historian K. Kasimov quipped. "Even his true Mongolian anthropological appearance has been distorted in favor of politics. To ensure an easy acceptance of him by ordinary people his giant statue in Tashkent was given Pamirian-Ferghana race's features which are characteristic to the modern Uzbeks."

The people of Central Asia remain sensitive about cultural heritage. Aware of the sensitivities, Soviet authorities handled matters of history with great caution, doing everything in their power to control discussion of the past. In the post-Soviet era, disputes over history have played prominent roles in some recent inter-ethnic clashes. For instance, history was a factor in the 1990 Osh rioting between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, in which dozens died.

Some Kyrgyz experts, however, are reluctant to accept Babur as Uzbek. They say that Babur, a direct descendent of Genghis Khan, does not fit any modern ethnic profile. His Mongolian and nomadic origins mean that he is closer to the Kyrgyz in ethnic identity than to the more sedentary Uzbeks, those experts add.

When Tajiks planned the celebration of the Samanid dynasty (9th-10th century) in 1997 it nearly became a subject of interstate tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Alarmed by prospective growth of national identity sense among its own Tajik people, which comprises a significant part of the Uzbekstan's population, especially in and around Samarkand, officials in Tashkent tried hard to play down the significance of the event.

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