he secretary-general of the World Customs Organization, Mr. Michel Danet, was received at the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Monday.

The Uzbek foreign minister, Abdulaziz Komilov, welcomed the high-ranking guest and said that good practical relations had been established between the World Customs Organization and Uzbekistan and that this organization had played a deserving role in creating a legal basis for Uzbekistan's customs system. He expressed a hope that his visit would serve to raise the relations to a new level.

Michel Danet thanked Komilov for the cordial reception and said that the Uzbek customs service had been developing in accordance with world standards and that its legal basis was close to international requirements. Issues of the further development of mutual relations were discussed during the talks.

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The Central Asian countries believe that the Taleban and [Saudi dissident] Usamah Bin Ladin financed the recent, August, hostilities on their borders, which caused instability in the region.

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special operation to find people illegally in possession of firearms has been carried out in Uzbek southern Surkhandarya Region. As a result of the operation, experts of the police department for fighting corruption, racketeering and terrorism detained a resident of Denau District, when he was attempting to sell for US dollars an assault rifle with two magazines and 45 live cartridges for it to a resident of the same District.

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n November 17, a Tashkent court handed out death sentences in abstenia to the two leaders of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Takhir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani. Ten other defendants -- including Muhammad Solih, the exiled leader of the Erk opposition party -- received 12- to 20-year prison terms. The trial was part of an ongoing crackdown on unsanctioned Islamic religious activity in Uzbekistan. [For additional information see Eurasia Insight Archives]. Some observers say the crackdown has unleashed a vicious cycle -- in which repression against Islamic believers fuels the IMU insurgency, prompting increased government harassment of religious activity. [For additional information see Eurasia Insight Archives]. EurasiaNet posed questions about the trial and its aftermath to Acacia Shields, who heads the Human Rights Watch office in Tashkent. The text of the interview follows:

EurasiaNet: What is your evaluation of how the government conducted the trial? Did the defendants who were present at the trial have an adequate legal defense?

Shields: That the Uzbek government held this trial at all was a violation of international standards. Trials in absentia are prohibited, as they do not give the defendant an opportunity to be present at his own hearing and they deprive a person of his right to launch a proper defense. Even beyond this question, however, the state conducted the trial poorly, with hardly a nod to proper trial procedure. In the first place, contrary to public announcements, the trial was closed to local activists, relatives of the defendants, and the general public. Human Rights Watch and other international observers were particularly disappointed to see that government failed once again to provide any material evidence of the defendants' guilt, particularly crucial in a case that carried the death penalty. Only half of one day was dedicated to the defense of all 12 men, provided by state-appointed lawyers representing those present and those outside the country. International observers dismissed the defense as weak and noted that not one witness was called on the side of those on trial.

EurasiaNet: Is there any significance to the fact that 10 of the defendants got prison terms of 12-20 years, instead of receiving a death sentence?

Shields: The prosecution's request for the death penalty for 10 of the 12 defendants, including opposition politician Muhammad Solih, raised considerable attention to, and concern about, the case within the international community. It would certainly be significant if, as it seems, the anticipated international outcry regarding the verdict was instrumental in the final outcome, namely the decision to hand down fewer death sentences. Courts in Uzbekistan normally stick very close to the wishes of the prosecution. However, there are other death penalty cases currently pending on similar charges and one must take all such cases into account, not only this high profile matter, before determining that a real change in policy has taken place.

EurasiaNet: Is there any significance as to the timing of this trial? Could it impact Uzbek efforts to find common ground with the Taliban?

Shields: We view the timing to be significant in another way. This trial came right on the heels of a US decision to name the IMU as an international terrorist organization. There is reason to fear that this US move was interpreted by the government of Uzbekistan as a "green light" to go ahead with this kind of trial.

EurasiaNet: How will the trial, and the convictions, influence the ongoing crackdown in Uzbekistan against unsanctioned Islamic activity? Do you expect the crackdown to intensify?

Shields: The effect of the trial on the crackdown will depend on the international response it generates. The international community needs to hold a firm line, signaling that such political show trials run contrary to Uzbekistan's international agreements, and belie promises of reform.

Unfortunately, with or without this trial, we see the crackdown continuing, with ongoing arrests of independent Muslims and their family members, and dozens of group trials taking place right now. The government shows no sign of reigning in its brutal police force, or stopping illegal arrests. In this climate of impunity, the international community has an obligation to speak with a loud and unified voice of the need for Uzbekistan to comply with human rights standards and observe rule of law. Muted responses and quiet diplomacy have not proved effective in this regard, and we look to the US and countries of the European Union in particular to use the leverage at their disposal to bring Uzbekistan into compliance with human rights.

EurasiaNet: Do you have any information about the reaction to the verdict in the Ferghana Valley?

Shields: At this time, we do not have information regarding the reaction in Ferghana Valley; however, we already see in Tashkent that many view the process with skepticism, regarding it as just another propaganda ploy. Many are surprised and even indignant about the spectacle of a trial without the majority of the defendants and see the trial as a political maneuver rather than the proper functioning of the judicial system. That said, disillusionment with the judicial system was already running high before this latest trial. The near-universality of abuse in their cases, including the denial of presumption of innocence, denial of legal counsel, physical mistreatment and torture by police, and serious corruption throughout the hierarchy, have caused those who have any contact with investigators, prosecutors, and judges to lose faith in the system.

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undreds of millions of dollars go missing every year in Central Asia, thanks to trade fraud. Exports are sent to strange destinations, and imports are not all they seem to be. The worst-affected countries are Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where both governments are responding through increased trade regulation. The unpleasant reality is that strange foreign trade flows are as much a result of official policy as outright mischief, with more state control likely to make matters worse. [For backrgound see EurasiaNet's Business & Economics Archive.]

Kazakhstan's problem is on the export side. According to the government, some of Kazakhstan's oil producers sell oil at discount prices to shell companies in Caribbean tax havens. These shell companies, having obtained Kazakh oil on the cheap, then sell it to the true end customers at far higher prices, a practice known as "transfer pricing." According to official figures, some crude was exported in the second quarter of 1999 for just $7.90 per barrel, while the price of Brent crude oil, a global price benchmark, was $15.40 per barrel. The true Kazakh oil export price to the end consumer was probably around $12.00 per barrel lower than Brent because of transport costs and blending, meaning that there was $4.10 per barrel difference for undeclared exports. The reason for this transfer pricing was that Kazakhstan imposed a 50 percent surrender requirement on all hard currency export earnings as of April 5, 1999. Exporters therefore had an incentive to under-declare the true value of their sales, thus avoiding selling hard currency to the government.

The surrender requirement was scrapped in November 1999, but oil exports to the Caribbean have risen steadily. In the first half of 2000 an incredible $1.1 billion of Kazakhstan's total $1.6 billion in oil exports went to the Caribbean. Grigori Marchenko, head of the National Bank of Kazakhstan, claims that 70 percent of all capital flight from Kazakhstan is a direct result of transfer pricing. The government threatened to impose export duties and even export quotas, but is instead bringing in regulations to completely ban transfer pricing. The Kazakh government is off target. While it is true that 250,000 barrels per day - out of total oil exports of 422,000 barrels per day in the first half of 2000 - went to the Caribbean, the export price achieved was quite high. Bermuda-registered companies bought 143,000 barrels per day of oil at $23.97 per barrel, while British Virgin Islands-registered firms took 107,000 barrels per day at $22.57 per barrel, according to official figures supplied by Golden Eagle Services, a local information company. By contrast, the average Kazakh oil export price in the first half of 2000 was $20.80 per barrel. The state-owned oil company, Kazakhoil, earns the least for its oil exports and sells to former Soviet markets. Kazakhoil is, however, politically well connected and so receives little, if any, government criticism.

Uzbekistan's trade problems are larger, as they involve both exports and imports. Uzbek trade controls are very strict on paper, but they are undermined by a system of low domestic prices and multiple exchange rates. In the case of the cotton industry, which is riddled with dishonesty and double-dealing, the issues arise at both the local and governmental levels. Every year a substantial part of the cotton crop is stolen and smuggled abroad. Farmers lie to provincial officials, who in turn lie to the central government in Tashkent. The reason is simple: in 2000, the government paid farmers just 9.9 cents (at the free market bazaar exchange rate) for their cotton, but exported that cotton for around 50 cents per pound. Unsurprisingly, declared cotton production in Uzbekistan is falling steadily. Whereas from 1991 to 1995 the average annual crop was 4,176.2 million tonnes, in 1996 to 2000 the annual average was 18.1 percent lower at 3,420.4 million tonnes. Some of this fall is due to the government's failure to reform the agriculture sector. The rest - in particular in Dzhizak and Syrdarya provinces, according to the IMF – can be attributed to light fingered farmers and officials withholding cotton and then selling it for their own benefit in Kazakhstan. Cotton fraud is something of a tradition in Uzbekistan. During the Soviet era, the Communist Party leader in Uzbekistan, Sharaf Rashidov, ripped off the Soviet government to the tune of billions of rubles (then worth something), by systematically inflating the size of the cotton crop. President Islam Karimov rehabilitated the disgraced Rashidov, turning him into a national hero and sending the, perhaps, unintentional signal that fraud is acceptable.

In addition, Uzbek officials are salting money abroad by manipulating import prices. According to official figures, capital goods made up 40 percent of all imports in the first half of 2000. This is consistent with President Islam Karimov's policy of giving capital goods imports privileged access to foreign exchange reserves, so that they can be used to build up domestic industries. Local managers take advantage of this by arranging for the foreign supplier to inflate the price of the capital goods. The difference between the true price and the price Uzbekistan pays is then split between the foreign supplier and the Uzbek importer, with the proceeds kept overseas.

Stricter regulations will drive honest investors away while encouraging the dishonest to be more skilfully devious. Kazakhstan cannot afford to alienate foreign investors— foreign joint ventures accounted for 56.4 percent of exports in the first half of 2000. Uzbekistan, which desperately needs foreign investment, must avoid enhancing its already poor reputation for bureaucracy and corruption. Both governments need to remember that sounder policies and a less corrupt business environment will attract more honest investors.

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The attack on its mountainous Batken region caught Kyrgyzstan unprepared, highlighting the dire state of its armed forces. President Askar Akaev freely admitted that the incident had been a lesson.

General patriotic support for the national campaign to repulse the invaders was matched by analysis in the independent press that was critical of the government's lack of preparation and recognized grievances the IMU had against the authoritarian regime of Uzbekistan's president Islam Karimov. As one Batken author, whose summer home had been occupied by the attackers, put it in a television interview: "It is wrong to label these people 'religious extremists and fundamentalists'- they are ordinary folk who have fled oppression in Uzbekistan."

The general reaction was illustrated by a fundraising music concert entitled: "Don't cry, I'll sing for you, my Batken." Including one bard's caricatures of the responses of different regional presidents, it was a mixture of patriotism, politics, humor and traditional music.

The response in Uzbekistan was markedly different, devoid of both humor and free debate. The state linked the IMU with deadly explosions in the capital Tashkent in February. This led to a heavy-handed crackdown on what it called 'religious extremists,' causing great alarm to human rights organizations.

While the fighting caused Uzbekistan, like Kyrgyzstan, to initiate military reforms, it has gone much further down the road of a militarization of society. The state-controlled media has given increasing prominence to the military. From video montages of special forces in operation to images of soldiers guarding tightly sealed-off borders, the armed forces are more prominent in society. The sense of a nation under threat from enemies within and without is daily bombarding the populace at large.

This trend has even affected popular music. Under strong government encouragement it has taken a profound 'patriotic turn,' with artists releasing numerous songs eulogizing homeland and nation. An example is provided by the 'Spice Girls' type pop-group Setora. The video for their recent hit song 'You're There' portrays the singer recalling times strolling with her lover, a handsome soldier killed while fighting dastardly Islamic-looking terrorists who have kidnapped women and children.

Such singers were brought together in what was called a 'Military-Patriotic Song Festival' at a stadium in Tashkent on July 1st this year, packed out with 15,000 young people. Involving military displays, sporting heroism and songs, it was named "I will give you up to no-one, Uzbekistan," the title of a song by leading singer Yulduz Osmonova. Once forced into exile abroad after making disparaging remarks about her country, she has since been reborn as a true patriot in line with the all-pervading ideology of state nationalism.

The event was highly charged. One weeping spectator said, "I am a guy, I have never cried... however for some reason, when listening to the songs at this festival, tears ran down from my eyes. I did not hide my tears. With my heart bursting over and together with all my comrades, I sang 'I will give you to no-one, Uzbekistan.'" A journalist for the popular youth magazine Darakchi wrote solemnly, "It started on July 1st. It will continue for ever." Amidst scenes of mass emotion and flag-waving televised across the country, a festival organizer declared triumphantly, "I believe our nation is a very strong nation. There will never be a nation like it."

The differences between this concert and the Kyrgyz one last autumn are illustrative of the way the two societies have responded to the war in Batken. Both governments have taken steps to strengthen their military and assess the impact of the conflict. While in Kyrgyzstan this has been done along with the type of critical debate possible in the relatively more open society, Uzbekistan has tied militarism to its existing program of authoritarian nationalism. This is creating a tense mix of patriotism and paranoia, which could prove explosive in a country home to sizable national minorities and struggling to cope with substantial economic difficulties.

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The official position concerning this issue is as follows: "The spread of HIV infection in Uzbekistan is in its early stage, but there are signs that the infection may grow in the near future. It is considered not as purely medical but as an important state problem. "Asked why the Government does not hurry to announce the beginning of an AIDS epidemic, the medics answered frankly that after doing that the Government will have to take some urgent measures: adopt and start implementing a comprehensive national program to prevent and fight the epidemic, set up appropriate funds and organizations, etc. This will require large funds that a country facing a socio-economic crisis lacks. For this reason, all work in this direction is confined to measures whose efficiency is zero.

Here is what an Uzbek newspaper wrote about this problem, summing up all that has been done in this sphere in the country. Repeating a myth that AIDS is a disease of social outcasts (homosexuals and prostitutes), the paper writes: "In 1987 Uzbekistan established the National Center to Prevent and Fight AIDS. On 14 June 1991 the country passed the law "On AIDS prevention" and some other documents. The 1990s have seen a number of seminars for health care and education specialists, representatives of religious communities, and the media. "And that's it...

Only this year which saw "a clap of thunder" whose echo reached only the medics (this information does not reach the public or reaches them in a vague form without concrete figures and with the abundance of words like 'nearly' and 'approximately') the government have begun taking some reluctant measures. Last August the Uzbek parliament passed a law "On the prevention of the diseases caused by HIV. "Since July 2000 HIV counseling stations have been opened in 8 regional centers of Uzbekistan and three in Tashkent. People applying to these counseling offices can get specialists' advice, have their health condition tested, and receive free syringes, condoms, and information brochures. From 1 December 1999 Uzbekistan started implementing a program, "Assistance to multisectoral efficient answer to HIV/AIDS, drug use, and sexually transmitted diseases," developed by Uzbekistan's Health Ministry and UNAIDS.

According to the Health Ministry, in 90 percent of cases HIV spreads through syringes shared by drug users (two thirds of them are young people aged 15-34).In other words, AIDS in Uzbekistan is a social disease caused by another social problem - the drug use which has widely spread in Uzbek society.

Other factors which favor the spread of HIV infection are the citizens' lack of knowledge, particularly the youth, about the ways of HIV contraction and the means of protection against the disease, as well as high prices for condoms (a pack of three latex condoms costs nearly US$1, which is too expensive for young people having active sexual contacts).A poll conducted among several dozens of young Tashkent citizens from different social groups of the age 20-33 (both men and women) has shown that most of them do not use condoms.

Besides AIDS, in the near future Uzbekistan may face another and maybe even more dangerous disease whose spread is much wider than that of HIV, according to medics. This is hepatitis C that also goes along with drug use.

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The tragic incident happened near the village of Farmonqurghon in Nov District [northern Tajikistan]. Doctors at Mastchoh District's Central Hospital were unable to save Yuldosh's life.

We recall that another resident of Mastchoh, Mulorajab Karimov, was shot dead by Uzbek border guards on 20th January.

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n all 4,500 people have contracted typhoid in Tajikistan over the last two months, the Uzbek `Pravda Vostoka' newspaper reported on 12th December.

It said that Uzbekistan's special commission on fighting epidemics had held a meeting, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Hamidulla Karomatov, to discuss ways of preventing typhoid in Uzbekistan.

"A complicated epidemiological situation concerning typhoid fever has emerged in neighbouring Tajikistan. Whereas in the first nine months of last year there were 2,986 cases of typhoid in that country, in the last two months of this year alone the number of such cases reached 4,500," the paper said.

The paper said that cases of typhoid in Uzbekistan had sharply dropped over the last five years, from 456 in 1995 to 137 in the year 2000.

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The sides discussed the further development of Uzbek-Kazakh relations on the basis of over 60 interstate documents signed between the two countries. It was noted that the main purpose was to expand relations between the countries on an equal and mutually advantageous basis and to make use of all existing opportunities.

The minister of foreign affairs of Kazakhstan will continue his meetings tomorrow as well. The members of the delegation will visit our republic's Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources and have relevant talks there. The guests will meet students and teachers at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent.

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